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Abstract 
 
The growing popularity and continuing development of cloud computing services is ever evolving and is slowly 
being integrated into our daily lives through our interactions with electronic devices. Cloud Computing has been 
heralded as the solution for enterprises to reduce information technology infrastructure cost by buying cloud 
services as a utility. While this premise is generally correct, in certain industries for example banking, the sensitive 
nature of the information submitted to the cloud for storage or processing places information security 
responsibilities on the party using the cloud services as well as the party providing them. Problems associated 
with cloud computing are loss of control, lack of trust between the contracting parties in the cloud relationship 
(customer and cloud service provider) and segregating data securely in the virtual environment.  
 
The risk and responsibilities associated with data loss was previously mainly reputational in nature but with the 
promulgation and signing by the South African Parliament of the Protection of Personal Information Bill (POPI) in 
August 2013 these responsibilities to protect information are in the process to be legislated in South Africa. The 
impact of the new legislation on the cloud computing environment needs to be investigated as the requirements 
imposed by the Bill might render the use of cloud computing in regard to sensitive data nonviable without 
replacing some of the IT infrastructure cost benefits that cloud computing allows with increased data security 
costs.  
 
In order to investigate the impact of the new POPI legislation on cloud computing, the components and 
characteristics of the cloud will be studied and differentiated from other forms of computing. 
The characteristics of cloud computing are the unique identifiers that differentiate it from Grid and Cluster 
computing. The component study is focused on the service and deployment models that can be associated with 
cloud computing. The understanding obtained will be used to compile a new definition of cloud computing. By 
utilizing the cloud definition of what components and processes constitute cloud computing the different types of 
data security processes and technical security measures can be implemented are studied. This will include 
information management and governance policies as well as technical security measures such as encryption and 
virtualisation security. The last part of the study will be focussed on the Bill and the legislated requirements and 
how these can be complied with using the security processes identified in the rest of the study. 
 
The new legislation still has to be signed by the State President after which businesses will have one year to 
comply and due to the short grace period businesses need to align their business practices with the proposed 
requirements. The impact is wide ranging from implementing technical information security processes to possible 
re-drafting of service level agreements with business partners that share sensitive information. The study will 
highlight the major areas where the Bill will impact businesses as well as identifying possible solutions that could 
be implemented by cloud computing users when storing or processing data in the cloud. 
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Uitreksel 
 
Die groei in gewildheid en die ontwikkeling van wolkbewerking dienste is besig om te verander en is stadig besig 
om in ons daaglikse lewens geintegreer te word deur ons interaksie met elektroniese toestelle. Wolkbewerking 
word voorgehou as ‘n oplossing vir besighede om hul inligtings tegnologie infrastruktuur kostes te verminder deur 
dienste te koop soos hulle dit benodig. Alhoewel die stelling algemeen as korrek aanvaar word, kan spesifieke 
industrië soos byvoorbeeld die bankwese se inligting so sensitief wees dat om die inligting aan wolkbewerking 
bloot te stel vir berging en prosesseering dat addisionele verantwoodelikhede geplaas op die verantwoordelike 
partye wat die wolk dienste gebruik sowel as die persone wat dit voorsien. Probleme geassosieër met wolk- 
bewerking is die verlies aan beheer, gebrekkige vertroue  tussen kontakteurende partye in die wolk verhouding 
(verbruiker en wolk dienste verskaffer) en die beveiliging van verdeelde inligting in die virtuele omgewing. 
 
Die risiko’s en verantwoordelikhede geassosieër met inligtings verlies was voorheen grootliks gebasseer op die 
skade wat aan die besigheid se reputasie aangedoen kan word, maar met die publiseering en ondertekening deur 
die Suid-Afrikaans Parliament  van die Beskerming van Persoonlike Inligting Wet (BVPI) in Augustus 2013  is 
hierdie verantwoordelikhede in die proses om in wetgewing in Suid Afrika vas gelê te word. Die impak van die 
nuwe wetgewing op die wolkbewering omgewing moet ondersoek word omdat die vereistes van die Wet die 
gebruik van wolkbewerking in terme van sensitiewe inligting so kan beinvloed dat dit nie die moeite werd kan 
wees om te gebruik nie, en veroorsaak dat addisionele verminderde IT infrastruktuur koste voordele vervang 
moet word met addisionele inligting beveiligings kostes.  
 
Om die impak van die nuwe BVPI wetgewing op wolkbewerking te ondersoek moet die komponente en karakter 
eienskappe van die wolk ondersoek word om vas te stel wat dit uniek maak van ander tipes rekenaar bewerking. 
Die karakter eienskappe van wolkbewerking is die unieke aspekte wat dit apart identifiseer van Rooster en Groep 
rekenaar bewerking. Die komponente studie sal fokus op die dienste en implimenterings modelle wat geassosieer 
word met wolkbewerking. Die verstandhouding wat deur voorsafgaande studie verkry is sal dan gebruik word om 
‘n nuwe definisie vir wolkbewerking op te stel. Deur nou van die definisie gebruik te maak kan die inligtings 
sekuriteit prosesse en tegniese sekuriteits maatreëls wat deur die verantwoordelike party en die wolkbewerkings 
dienste verskaffer gebruik kan word om die komponente en prosesse te beveilig bestudeer word. Die studie sal 
insluit, inligtings bestuur prosesse en korporatiewe bestuur asook tegniese beveiligings maatreels soos kodering 
en virtualisasie sekuriteit. Die laaste deel van die studie sal fokus op die BVPI wetgewing en die vereistes en hoe 
om daaraan te voldoen deur die sekuritiets maatreëls geidentifiseer  in die res van die studie te implimenteer. 
 
Die nuwe wetgewing moet nog deur die Staats President onderteken word waarna besighede ‘n jaar sal he om 
aan die vereistes te voldoen en omdat die periode so kort is moet besighede hulself voorberei en besigheid 
prosesse aanpas. Die impak van die wetgewing strek baie wyd en beinvloed van tegnise inligtings beveiligings 
prosesse tot kontrakte aangaande diens lewering wat dalk oor opgestel moet word tussen partye wat sensitiewe 
inligting uitruil. Die studie sal die prominente areas van impak uitlig asook die moontlike oplossings wat gebruik 
kan word deur partye wat wolkbewerking gebruik om inligting te stoor of te bewerk. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Methodology 
 
1.1) Background 
 
Cloud Computing is not an entirely new concept and the dream of computing as a utility has been around since 
1961 when computing pioneer, John McCarthy predicted that “computation may someday be organised as a 
public utility”(J. McCarthy cited in Garfinkel, 2011).  The “cloud” and the different names and formats it has been 
marketed as since then is ever evolving and the interaction with everyday life through interaction with electronic 
devices is becoming more common.  
Cloud computing offers numerous benefits as well as some new unique hardware aspects such as the illusion of 
infinite up-front resources available on demand, the elimination of an up-front capital commitment by cloud 
users and the ability to pay for use of computing resources on a short-term basis as needed (Armbrust et al., 
2009).  
Cloud computing thus realises the dream of selling computing as a utility and allows cloud computing providers 
the opportunity to build large data centres at a low cost and by managing and provisioning the processing and 
storage requirement cost savings can be achieved. The centralised management of resources allows for better 
utilisation and limits any costs associated with over capacity in a network (Chen & Paxson, 2010).  
Cloud computing in this context refers to both the applications delivered as services over the Internet and the 
hardware and system software in the datacentres that provide those services (Armbrust et al., 2009). 
1.2) Purpose of the Study 
 
“Cloud Computing is an emerging computing paradigm in which resources of the computing infrastructure are 
provided as services over the Internet” (Yu et al., 2010). The description of what does and does not constitute 
cloud computing is wide ranging and in order to investigate the cloud security implications it has to be properly 
defined and isolated to allow exclusion of non-cloud based infrastructure and security processes. 
This study investigates which technology forms part of the cloud environment by defining cloud computing, how 
to secure the cloud from a cloud service provider view as well as what a cloud customer has to be cognisant of 
when making the decision to use cloud computing.  
The paper concludes with a review of the potential impact of the proposed Protection of Public Information Bill 
on the parties involved in the value chain of cloud computing. 
1.3) Limitations of study 
 
The study proposes to investigate whether the new Protection of Personal Information Bill will impact so 
negatively on the technical data security requirements of “Responsible parties” and “Cloud Service Providers” 
that it will negate some of the perceived benefits of cloud computing. 
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The impact of the Protection of Personal Information Bill when enacted on “cloud service providers” and 
“responsible parties” (data gatherers) is still unclear and has potentially far reaching implications for both parties. 
The study will investigate and discuss the impact based on available literature regarding technical data security in 
a cloud environment and the requirements of the Bill as proposed. 
In order to investigate the impact on the cloud service providers and responsible parties clarity must first be 
obtained as to which outsourced services would constitute “Cloud Computing”. To this end “Cloud Computing” 
will be defined in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3 the security risks and technical security measures used to secure the cloud and data transfers will be 
investigated. This investigation is limited to the broad security measures available in the cloud computing 
environment. The list is not extensive or complete as there are numerous measures that can be used to secure 
networks, but a complete list is beyond the scope of this study. The measures identified will first be discussed on 
a technical basis and then in relation to how it can secure a cloud computing environment. 
In Chapter 4 the requirements that the Bill imposes on cloud participants (The responsible party and operator as 
defined) will be investigated and linked back to the security control and measures that where identified in 
Chapter 3. 
The research project is subject to the following limitations: 
 Due to the fact that the Bill has still to be enacted and applicable case law and legal pronouncements and 
interpretations will only be made following the Bill’s enactment by Parliament no legal interpretations will 
be investigated except those published as guidelines by the South African Law Society and other 
professional bodies.  
 The Bill’s sections will be interpreted in its simplest form and the focus of the study will be on the 
technical cloud and data security implications and how to address these. 
1.4) Research Study methodology 
 
Methodology steps: 
Step 1:  Define Cloud computing. 
1. Perform a literature review of published journal articles and white papers relating to the following terms: 
Cloud computing, SAAS (Software as a Service), Private Cloud, Public Cloud, PAAS (Platform as a Service) 
2. Define Cloud computing taking the readings in number 1 above into account. 
Step 2:  Investigate the data security frameworks and data security risks and controls in a cloud environment 
1. List and discuss the risks associated with Cloud computing focusing primarily on those risks that impact on 
information security and privacy. 
2. Investigate the data security frameworks and data security relevant to “cloud computing” and discuss this 
in terms of strategic risks and operational risk and the impact it has on mitigation of these risks. 
3. Investigate the technical data security implications on cloud computing environment that might be 
impacted by the requirements of the POPI Bill. 
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Step 3:  Form an understanding of the potential impacts of the Protection of Personal Information Bill. 
1. Study the proposed Protection of Personal Information Bill in the format presented by the Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development to the National Assembly and passed on 11 
September 2012.  
2. Investigate the impact of the proposed POPI legislation on cloud computing extending the research to 
both “responsible parties” and cloud computing providers (“operators”) in terms of the Bill. 
Chapter 5 concludes the study with final remarks and findings as well as possible recommendations for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 – Defining Cloud Computing 
 
2.1) Introduction to defining cloud computing  
 
A review of the available definitions and characteristics of cloud computing in available academic literature as 
well as other sources on the internet has indicated that the term is neither understood nor have the boundaries 
been defined as to what is included and excluded from the concept.  Considerable uncertainty exists among 
consumers regarding what cloud computing is and which services can be classified as cloud services (Enslin, 2012). 
Cloud computing are current loosely defined, and such associated activities as photo sharing, social media, mobile 
phones, computers and servers are included in what consumers interpret as the cloud.   
There are still no widely accepted definition for cloud computing albeit the cloud computing practice has 
attracted much attention.  
 
Wang & von Laszewski (2008) identified the main reasons for the confusion as follows: 
 
• Cloud computing information technology engineers and researchers approach cloud computing from different 
backgrounds and points of view. Based on their experience and points of reference they might view, for example 
grid computing, as a form of cloud computing. 
• The technologies which are enablers of cloud computing such as Web 2.0 and Service Oriented Computing 
(SOC) are still evolving and progressing and the boundaries has not been clearly defined of what cloud computing 
constitutes. 
• The limited use and uptake by businesses of existing computing clouds still lack large scale deployment and 
usage, which would finally justify the concept of cloud computing.  
 
This study proposes to use the available definitions to identify the common thread that defines cloud computing 
as unique. This will require that the characteristics of cloud computing is investigated as a “new” definition can 
only be developed by identifying what types of processing is excluded form cloud computing. 
 
The process to define cloud computing is that of elimination, firstly of concepts that are similar but have distinct 
differentiating characteristics and secondly to identify a definition by identifying cloud definitions and aggregating 
their commonalities.  
 
2.2) Analysis of cloud computing commonalities  
 
By first defining Clusters and Grids the commonalities with cloud computing can be identified and factors that are 
not part of the cloud computing environment can be excluded. 
2.2.1) Definition of Clusters and Grids 
 
Buyya, Yeo, Venugopal,  Broberg, & Brandic (2008), define both Clusters and Grids as: 
Cluster: ”A cluster is a type of parallel and distributed system, which consists of a collection of inter-connected 
stand-alone computers working together as a single integrated computing resource”.  
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Grid: “A Grid is a type of parallel and distributed system that enables the sharing, selection, and aggregation of 
geographically distributed ‘autonomous’ resources dynamically at runtime depending on their availability, 
capability, performance, cost, and users’ quality of service requirements”.  
By keeping these definitions in mind a review of the unique characteristics of the cloud computing environment 
can be performed which will indicate the differences between the cloud and cluster computing and grid 
computing. 
To investigate the building blocks of the cloud paradigm the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) definition will be used. (Mell & Grance 2011) 
 
The definition provides the characteristics, deployment and service models that can be typically found in the 
cloud environment and by investigating each area the differences between the cloud and cluster and grid 
computing will be identified.  
 
The second area to investigate is the unique characteristics of cloud computing. 
2.2.2) Characteristics of Cloud Computing 
 
The Characteristics of cloud computing are those unique identifying attributes that distinguishes cloud computing 
from any other distributed computing concept. 
Table 2.1 – Cloud Computing Characteristics 
 
CHARACTERISTIC DESCRIPTION 
On-demand self-service A consumer can unilaterally request 
computing capabilities, such as server time 
and network storage, as needed 
automatically without requiring human 
interaction with each service’s provider. 
Self-service cloud offerings must provide 
easy-to-use, intuitive user interfaces that 
equip users and empower them to be able to 
productively manage the service delivery 
lifecycle. 
Best of breed self-service provides users the 
ability to upload, build, deploy, schedule, 
manage, and report on their business 
services on demand.  
 
Broad Network Access Capabilities are available over the network 
and accessed through standard mechanisms 
that promote use by heterogeneous thin or 
thick client platforms (e.g. Mobile phones, 
laptops, and PDAs). 
 
Resource pooling The provider’s computing resources are 
pooled to serve multiple consumers using a 
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CHARACTERISTIC DESCRIPTION 
multi-tenant model, with different physical 
and virtual resources dynamically assigned 
and reassigned according to consumer 
demand. There is a sense of location 
independence in that the customer generally 
has no control or knowledge over the exact 
location of the provided resources but may 
be able to specify location at a higher level of 
abstraction (e.g., country, state, or data 
centre). Examples of resources include 
storage, processing, memory, network 
bandwidth, and virtual machines. 
 
Rapid Elasticity/ Dynamic 
infrastructure 
 
Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically 
provisioned, in some cases automatically, to 
quickly scale out, and rapidly released to 
quickly scale in. To the consumer, the 
capabilities available for provisioning often 
appear to be unlimited and can be 
purchased in any quantity at any time. 
Cloud computer service providers need to 
invest in dynamic virtualized and 
standardised infrastructure. This enables 
expansion without requiring architecture 
rework.  
 
Measured Service Cloud systems automatically control and 
optimize resource use by leveraging a 
metering capability at some level of 
abstraction appropriate to the type of 
service (e.g. storage, processing, bandwidth, 
and active user accounts). Resource usage 
can be monitored, controlled, and reported, 
providing transparency for both the provider 
and consumer of the utilized service. 
Any Cloud computing service provider must 
provide mechanisms to capture usage 
information that enables chargeback 
reporting and/or integration with billing 
systems. 
This enables the user to monitor and control 
costs. 
Different models may be used for billing such 
as: Fixed tariff plans, Pay-as-u-use, Prepaid 
 
Source: Adapted from (Mell & Grance 2011) 
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These attributes differentiates cloud computing form other forms of distributed computing and by extending the 
study to the service models employed in the cloud environment additional unique identifiers can be identified. 
2.3) Service Models 
 
The Service model to which a cloud conforms dictates an organisations scope and control over computational 
environment, and characterizes a level of abstraction for its use (Mell & Grace, 2011). 
The most effective method to investigate and understand the service models applicable to cloud computing is to 
depict it graphically. 
Figure 2.1 – Cloud Computing Architecture 
 
 
 
Source: Zhang, Cheng & Boutaba (2010) 
2.2.1) Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS)  
 
The capability provided to the customer is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. 
The applications are accessible from various client devices through a thin client interface such as a web browser 
(e.g., web-based email). The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including 
network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible 
exception of limited user-specific applications configuration settings (Mell & Grace, 2011).  
2.2.2) Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
 
The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created using 
programming languages and tools supported by the provider. The consumer does not manage or control the 
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underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the 
deployed applications and possibly application hosting environment configurations (Mell & Grace, 2011).  
2.2.3) Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (Iaas) 
 
The capability provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental 
computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include 
operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, deployed applications, and possibly limited control 
of selected networking components (e.g., host firewalls) (Mell & Grace, 2011).  
 
The layered architecture of the cloud is evident by the study of the service models and due to the interdependent 
nature of each layer on another they security in each layer impacts on the total security of the cloud. This 
interdependency will be further investigated in Chapter 3. 
Cloud computing can be deployed in different models broadly characterized by the management and disposition 
of the computational resources for delivery of the cloud services to the end users (Jansen & Grance, 2011). Below 
these deployment models will be discussed further to assist in the identification of the unique characteristics of 
cloud computing. 
2.4) Deployment Models 
 
Cloud computing can broadly be distinguished by two distinct deployment models namely public cloud computing 
(or public cloud) or private cloud computing (or private cloud) as per Plummer et al. (2009). 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (2009) has expanded the deployment models into two 
additional distinct models namely a Community Cloud and a Hybrid Cloud. 
Table 2.2 expands our understanding of these models. 
 
Table 2.2 – Cloud Computing Deployment Models 
 
DEPLOYMENT 
MODEL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Private Cloud  
 The cloud is operated soles for an organisation. 
 Managed by either the organisation or a third 
party. 
 Hosting could be onsite or at another location. 
 
Community Cloud 
 
 The cloud is shared by a number of organisations. 
 The organisations sharing the cloud have shared 
needs/requirements. 
 Examples of these shared needs are: security, 
policy and compliance. 
 The cloud can be managed by either the 
organisation or a third party. 
 Hosting could be onsite or at another location. 
 
Public Cloud  Cloud services made available to the general public 
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DEPLOYMENT 
MODEL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 or large industry groups. 
 The Cloud Services are owned by a business selling 
cloud services. 
Hybrid Cloud 
 
 The Cloud infrastructure is a combination/ 
composition of two of the other cloud computing 
deployment models. 
 The two clouds remain unique entities. 
 Clouds are bound together by using standard or 
proprietary technology that enables data and 
application portability between clouds. 
 
Source: Mell & Grance (2011) and Armbrust et al. (2009) 
 
The investigation into the unique characteristics can now be supported with the available cloud computing 
definitions and by combining all of these factors and characteristics a new and complete definition can be 
compiled. 
2.5) Literature study of existing cloud definitions 
 
Available cloud computing definitions: 
1) “A large-scale distributed computing paradigm that is driven by economies of scale, in which a pool of 
abstracted virtualised, dynamically-scalable, managed computing power, storage, platforms and services are 
delivered on demand to external customers over the Internet”( Foster, Zhao, Raicu, Lu, 2008).  
2) A Cloud is a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a collection of inter-connected and virtualised 
computers that are dynamically provisioned and presented as one or more unified computing resource(s) based 
on service-level agreements established through negotiation between the service provider and consumers (Buyya 
et al., 2008).  
3) Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool 
of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction (Mell & Grance, 
2011). 
4) A Computing Cloud is a set of network enabled services, providing scalable, QoS guaranteed, normally 
personalized, inexpensive computing platforms on demand, which could be accessed in a simple and pervasive 
way (Wang & von Laszewski, 2008).  
 
5) The main idea of cloud computing is to build a virtualized computing resource pool by centralizing abundant 
computing resources connected with network and present the service of infrastructure, platform and software 
(Che, Duan, Zhang & Fan, 2011).  
 
6) Gartner defines cloud computing as a style of computing in which scalable and elastic IT-enabled capabilities 
are delivered as a service to external customers using Internet technologies (Gartner IT Glossary). 
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7) Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (for example, networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal effort or service provider interaction (Pallis, 2010). 
 
As can be seen in the literature study of available cloud definitions there are varying interpretations of what cloud 
computing involves and how to define the paradigm. 
 
Both Foster et al. (2008) and Vaquero, Rodero-Meniro, Caceres & Lindner, (2009) identify some unique 
characteristics that differentiate cloud computing from grid and cluster computing. The first concept is that of 
delivering services opposed to components. Secondly is the concept of payment based on usage and not on 
physical assets. Thirdly is the idea of scalability which includes the concepts of flexibility and low barriers to entry 
for customers. Finally the delivery of Internet Technologies implies that specific standards are adhered to and that 
multiple customers, leveraging shared resources increase the clouds economies of scale.  
 
Using these unique characteristics a new cloud definition is compiled. 
 
2.6) New Definition of Cloud Computing 
 
Cloud computing is an on demand service based methodology of computing via the internet where hardware is 
shared by multiple users which is characterised by being scalable and flexible with low barriers of entry. The 
model is based on the fact that services are sold resulting in lower costs due to economies of scale.  Users of 
cloud computing technology do not have to be technology experts and use of the technology is fairly 
uncomplicated. 
 
The unique identifying characteristics highlighted above such as scalability and flexibility and low barriers to entry 
in the new definition sets cloud computing apart from the “supercomputers” of the past. Cloud computing 
enables users to acquire processing power and an almost infinite capacity to store data, additionally users only 
pay for the services and capacity used. Grid and cluster computing had a limited use in business life as it just was 
not accessible to businesses without large IT infrastructure expenses, but cloud computing has addressed the cost 
constraint and made processing power more accessible and cost effective.  
 
With a better understanding of what constitutes the cloud computing paradigm the technology to secure the 
cloud can be investigated. 
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Chapter 3 – List and discussion of information security risks in a Cloud 
Computing environment and Technical solutions to limit these risks 
 
3.1) Introduction 
 
One of the major concerns associated with cloud computing is regarding security and trust between cloud 
computing parties (Bose, Luo, Lui, 2013). In order for cloud computing to become a viable option for businesses, 
in regard to the processing of sensitive information, the associated security processes will have to be enhanced to 
provide cloud clients with assurance regarding sensitive data. In order for cloud computing to grow in popularity 
these security risks will have be addressed and mitigated to an acceptable level.  
The cloud computing environment has benefits such as scalability, flexibility and low barriers to entry that all 
result in lower IT infrastructure costs. These benefits are however only applicable if the data storage and 
processing that is performed in the cloud environment is secure and trusted by the customers of the cloud 
providers. This fear by customers of security in the cloud environment is reflected in a recent study of more than 
500 chief executives an IT managers in 17 countries that resulted in the following findings that despite the 
potential benefits, the executives “trust existing systems over cloud-based systems due to the fear about security 
threats and loss of control of data and systems” (Circle ID Survey 2009). 
These fears of cloud security are worsened by the legislative requirements that many countries impose on the 
responsible parties (entity that uses cloud services) as these have increased the risk from purely reputational to 
include fines and possible jail sentences.  
The requirements of the Protection of Personal Information Bill (see table 3.1) regarding secure data processing 
and the impact of these requirements can only be addressed by investigating the how to enhance numerous 
security measures that can be employed to secure the cloud. The investigation will also extend to information 
security policies and good IT governance practices as they form an integral part of changing behaviour to secure 
information. 
The investigation has to question whether cloud computing, taking into account the legislative requirements and 
the impact, can still be a viable option for businesses to process and store sensitive data. Each of the security 
processes studies will be compared to the requirement in the POPI legislation as it mitigates the legislative impact 
of the Bill. This comparison will form part of the conclusion to the study in Chapter 5.  
The list of security measures is not complete or exhaustive as the security measures employed will vary based on 
the deployment model and service model of the cloud to be secured as well as the fact that the sensitivity of the 
data and the interfaces between the cloud parties (customer and cloud service provider) will not be standardised. 
For example a customer can use the cloud only for data storage and this will require different security measures 
by the customer and the cloud service provider than in the instance where software as a service is used as a 
service model and a web interface communicates directly into the cloud and computational request are 
performed by the cloud and returned to the user of the browser. 
Subashini & Kavitha (2010) remarks that cloud computing moves application software and databases to large data 
centres where the management of this information might not be trustworthy. The challenges associated with 
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cloud computing are accessibility vulnerabilities, virtualisation vulnerabilities, web application vulnerabilities and 
physical access issues.  
In order to address and investigate the vulnerabilities the cloud architecture has to be studied. 
Figure 3.1 provides possible security solutions based on each level of the cloud architecture and based on the 
deployment model and service model some or all of these can be implemented to secure the cloud.  
Figure 3.1 – Cloud Computing Security Architecture 
 
Source: Chen & Zhoa, 2012 
Each area will not be investigated separately as some areas will be combined in the study.  
The first step into the investigation regarding the cloud is to identify the principles of what secure computing 
comprises by investigating both the requirements set out in the applicable ISO standards as well as promulgated 
Protection of Personal Information Bill. 
The International Organisation for Standardization’s Information Security Statement 7498-2 lists a number of 
suggested themes to be implemented that will result in secure computing (International Organisation for 
Standardization, 1989). The Proposed Protection of Personal Information Bill has similar themes (called 
“conditions” in the Bill) and prior to the discussion of the information security risks it is prudent to list and discuss 
the similarities regarding the two sets of requirements. 
These similarities will be the overriding theme in any process, policy or technical security measure 
implementation as they form the basis and principles against which the effectiveness of the security measure will 
be measured.   
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Table 3.1 – Comparison of information security requirements in ISO 7498-2 and POPI Bill 
ISO 7498-2 Requirements POPI Bill 2009 Discussion 
Identification and 
authentication 
Accountability Users of the cloud must be 
identified and access priorities 
and permissions may be 
granted accordingly. 
Authority Processing Limitation Authorisation is an important 
security requirement in cloud 
computing to ensure referential 
integrity is maintained. Control 
has to be exerted over 
privileges and process flows to 
maintain the integrity of the 
data. 
Confidentiality Purpose Specification Control of data over multiple 
distributed databases has to be 
maintained especially in a 
public cloud do to its 
accessibility over the Internet. 
Information security protocols 
have to be enforced over 
various layers of cloud 
applications. 
Integrity Further Processing Limitation The integrity of data in the 
cloud is dependent on both the 
due diligence in accessing date 
as well as processing data. 
Non-repudiation Information Quality Non-repudiation in Cloud 
computing can be obtained by 
applying the traditional e-
commerce security protocols 
and token provisions to data 
transmissions within cloud 
applications such as digital 
signatures, timestamps and 
confirmation receipts services 
(digital receipting of messages 
confirming data sent/received). 
Availability Openness This is one of the key 
components in deciding which 
cloud deployment model to use 
(public, private, hybrid or 
community) as the risk of non-
availability has to be assessed. 
The risk can be largely 
mitigated by a service level 
agreement. 
No requirement in ISO standard Security safeguards Chapter 4 of this study is 
dedicated to the security 
requirements of the Bill.                                                                                         
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ISO 7498-2 Requirements POPI Bill 2009 Discussion 
No requirement in ISO standard Data subject participation This requirement is not 
addressed in the ISO standard, 
but in terms of the Bill a data 
subject must have the 
opportunity to amend his/her 
personal information. 
Source: International Organisation for Standardization, 1989, South Africa, 2009 
Both sets of requirements in the ISO statement and the Bill are similar and by addressing these requirements 
regarding secure information handling the quality and appropriateness of processes to be implemented can be 
measured.  
These principles identified in Table 3.1 can now be applied to a cloud environment  by identifying the information 
security risks in the cloud environment and applying the principles to each risk identified the risk can be 
addressed and mitigated. 
3.2) Identifying Cloud Computing Risks 
 
Che et al. (2011) investigates the different security models that can be used to identify the risks and weaknesses 
in the cloud computing infrastructure. Based on the study four different models to identify the risks in a public 
cloud are identified and will be discussed: 
a) Multi-Tenancy Model  
Figure 3.2 – Multi-Tenancy Model in Cloud Computing 
 
 
Source: Che et al. (2011) 
Che et al., 2011 discusses the Multi-Tenancy Model that allows multiple applications of cloud service provider to 
run on a physical server and offer services to customers. The physical server is partitioned and the user sees each 
virtual server as a single server. By partitioning a physical server into numerous virtual machines this 
“virtualisation” enables the sharing of computing resources such as processing, memory, storage, applications 
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and ensures that cloud resources are optimally utilized. The benefit of hosting different customer’s applications 
and data on different virtual machines is that processing errors, viruses and malicious attacks can be isolated. 
Multi-Tenancy has some complexities to it such as data isolation, architecture extension (flexibility and 
scalability), and configuration self-definition and performance customization. Data isolation requires that 
different customer’s data do not come in contact with one another and that both processing and data storage is 
unique to each customer. The Multi-Tenancy model should provide a basic framework to implement a high 
degree of flexibility and scalability. The theme of configuration self-definition is based on the architecture 
extension principle as users/customers respective demands have to be supported. The Multi-Tenancy cloud has 
to enable the optimum utilization under different workloads and user requirements. 
The Multi-Tenancy model security benefits are the fact that segmentation and isolation is obtained through the 
virtualization of a server. These benefits are also the risks associated with identified in this model. 
The characteristics of segregation of data and multiple user access are the main risks that this model highlights, 
but based on where the servers performing the processing and data storage are situated regulatory compliance, 
storage and recovery of data could also be risk associated with this model. 
The second model that Che et al. (2011) investigated where the Cloud Security Risk Accumulation model by the 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA).  
b) The Cloud Risk Accumulation Model of CSA  
Che et al. 2011 remarks that the interdependent dependency on each layer in the cloud architecture has to be 
taken into account when analysing the risks in each layer. A weakness in a layer will influence the risk in that layer 
as well as the layer that is built using the weakened layer as foundation. 
This risk identification model identifies the risk in each layer, starting at the physical layer the weaknesses and 
resulting risks in each layer is accumulated to result in a complete list of risks relative to each layer and the 
weakness in each layer. 
The figure below depicts a wide list of technical security risks  regarding the securing of data in the different 
layers/levels in the cloud, but the risks that are associated with cloud computing is wider than just data security as 
is discussed further in this section. 
Table 3.2 – Cloud computing security risks  
Layer Service Level Security 
Requirements 
Threats 
Application Layer  Software as a 
Service (SaaS) 
 Privacy in 
multitenant 
environment 
 Data protection 
from exposure 
 Access control 
 Communication 
protection 
 Software security 
 Service availability 
 Interception of data 
 Modification of data at rest and in 
transit 
 Data deletion 
 Privacy breach 
 Impersonation (Man-in-the-middle 
attacks) 
 Session hacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
 
Virtual Layer  Platform as a 
Service (PaaS) 
 Access control 
 Application Security 
 Programming errors 
 Software modification 
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 Infrastructure as 
a Service (IaaS) 
 Data security (data 
in transit or at rest) 
 Cloud management 
control security 
 Secure images 
 Virtual cloud 
protection 
 Communication 
security 
 Software deletion 
 Impersonation 
 Session hacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
 Connection flooding 
 DDOS attacks 
 Disrupting communications 
Physical Layer  Physical 
Datacentres 
 No illegal abuse of 
cloud computing 
 Hardware security 
 Hardware reliability  
 Network protection 
 Network resources 
protection 
 Natural Disasters 
 Network attacks 
 Hardware theft 
 Hardware interruption 
 Hardware modification 
 Misuse of infrastructure 
 Connection flooding 
 DDOS attacks 
 
Source: Zissis & Lekkas, 2012 (Amended) 
In table 3.2 it can be noted that numerous threats are similar across the different layers and that the security 
requirements are similar in some instances but also differ from layer to layer. Another method of identifying risk 
in the cloud environment is the Jerico Formu’s Cube (Jerico Formu, 2009). 
c) Jerico Formu’s Cloud Cube Model 
The third method of identifying risks in the cloud environment is based on the Jerico formu’s Cloud Cube Model. 
This model uses a figurative description of the security attributes implied in the service and deployment models 
of cloud computing as well as indicating the location, manager and owner of the computing resources (Jerico 
Formu, 2009). The risk attributes of a specific cloud environment is influenced by these parameters and different 
combinations will result in different risk profiles. 
Figure 3.3 – Depiction of the Jerico Cube 
 
 
Source: Che et al. (2011), Cloud Computing Alliance, (2011) & Jerico Formu (2009)  
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Jerico Formu (2009), discusses the parameters of the cube and how each impact on the risk of the specific cloud 
configuration.  
The parameters this method addresses are internal or external storage of data, the deployment model of the 
cloud meaning private cloud, public cloud or combination of the two (in this work it is called Proprietary or Open), 
and whether the security processes of the business applies to the cloud data. 
 Internal/External: This parameter refers to the location the data is stored in the cloud. If the physical 
location of data is inside the data owner’s boundary the model parameter is internal. 
 
 Proprietary/Open: This parameter defines the ownership of the cloud’s technology, service and interface. 
It indicates the level of portability of data between proprietary systems and other cloud components and 
the transforming of data between cloud components. The difference between Proprietary and Open is 
that in a proprietary cloud the provider holds the ownership of the cloud infrastructure and platform and 
customers cannot transfer their applications from one cloud service provider to another. In an Open cloud 
the technology are uniform which results in more competitive service providers and less constraints to 
integrate between different cloud and business partners. 
 
 Perimeterised/ De-Perimeterised:  This parameter defines the architectural design of the clouds security 
protection and whether a customer’s application is inside or outside the traditional security boundary. 
Perimeterised indicates that the customers application is operating within the traditional security controls 
such as a firewall that limits movement of data between different security zones. De-Perimeterised refers 
to a less defined IT security boundary and requires the use of protocols to enable business to interact 
with each other without boundaries, irrespective of the location of the data or the number of 
collaborating parties. The Collaboration Orientated Architectures Framework (COA) sets out these 
protocols and requirements to implement a De-Perimeterised network. 
 
 Insourced/Outsourced: This model parameter is in the 4th dimension and can be in two states in each of 
the eight cloud forms. Insourced refers to the cloud service being presented by the businesses own 
employees and outsourced refer to the service presented by a cloud service provider. 
Additional attributes like Offshore and Onshore can also be added to increase the dimensions to identify risks 
(Che et al., 2011). 
The final model is based on the principle of gap analysis where the gaps between the cloud infrastructure, the 
cloud security model and the overall compliance and information security management model is analysed and 
risks documented resulting from these gaps.  
d) The Mapping Model of Cloud, Security and Compliance 
The cloud mapping model is depicted in Figure 3.4 and identifies the gaps in security processes between the 
compliance, security and cloud model that results in data security risks. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Depiction of the process of cloud risk mapping 
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Che et al., 2011 discusses that the mapping model uses the different areas in the cloud (Architecture, security 
model of the cloud and the compliance requirements of the industry the cloud is active in) to identify and analyse 
gaps between the different areas and strategies. These gaps result in risks where one part of the cloud is not 
adequately secured in relation to either the compliance expectation or the current security model employed and 
unless addressed the cloud might be open for attack. 
These models are primarily effective in identifying the data security risks, but the additional risks that cloud 
computing has, such as data recoverability and denial of service by the cloud service provider are discussed 
below. 
3.2.1) Identified Cloud Computing Risks 
 
Brodkin (2008) & (Foster, et al. 2009) identify a number of additional cloud computing risks based on the 
principles identified in the ISO statement and the Bill in Table 3.1. These additional risks are discussed below: 
 Regulatory compliance > Customers making use of the Cloud service provider (CSP) is ultimately 
responsible for their own data in the cloud and where they are storing and processing personal 
information the onus is on the responsible party to secure this data. Service level agreements with cloud 
providers can assist in assigning responsibility and remedial action in case of breach. There is however 
privacy laws in various countries that requires sensitive data to be stored on a server that is physically in 
that country.  
 
 User Access > As soon as data is communicated and processed outside the physical and logical controls of 
an organisation the inherent risk increases for unlawful access. The data communicated and stored in the 
cloud is dependent on the security measures and protocols that the cloud provider supplies. This can be 
managed and influenced by a strong service level agreement, but in case of a security breach the cloud 
provider might not be forthcoming with this fact as it will impact his business and tarnish the businesses 
reputation. 
 
 Data storage location (Physical site of virtual server)> Users of cloud services might not know the physical 
location of the servers where their data is stored or where operation on the data is performed. When 
coupling this with the different data protection legislation in the different geographical areas it results in 
a high probability that the end user data might be physically in a country where the data protection 
legislation is weaker than the jurisdiction where the end users business is registered. An second 
complexity is that where a service provider does not return a user data at the end of the business 
relationship the legal enforceability of any SLA or other sections of the agreement between the User and 
the cloud service provider will depend on the interpretation of the laws and legal system in the countries 
that are involved (Country of origin of business and country where data is stored on server). 
 
 Segregation of Data > The major benefits of cloud computing (cost and scalability) requires the cloud 
service provider to make use of virtualised machines/servers where numerous clients data is hosted on 
one server and the back end is shared with every user having the impression that their data is secure on a 
server. This results in clients’ data being “next to each other” and if proper segregation and encryption is 
not present data could end up corrupted. 
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 Recovery of data > The data recovery risk is broken down into to focus areas. Firstly the need for the 
cloud service provider to have a robust Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is case of an emergency. This risk can 
be managed with a SLA, but if the plan is not tested or if it I not working and data is not available this can 
be detrimental to a business. Secondly the recovery of data when a business relationship ends has to be 
managed as the return or deletion of this data could impact the future confidentiality of the data. 
  
 Continuity of CSP > Due to the nature of cloud computing the data that is being stored or processed are 
placed in control of the cloud service provider. If this CSP is not backed financially by a strong business 
that is economically viable the provider might disappear and any recovery of client data might be difficult 
to recover. 
 
 Investigative support > Processing and data in the cloud could be stored over various servers and logging 
of processes for different customers will be difficult and any investigating any data leakage or any other 
form of data manipulation will be extremely difficult. 
 
These risks are not exhaustive as the service model utilised by the user will impact some additional risks such as 
the CSP being able to view sensitive data to allow computations and processing in the cloud. 
The principles of secure data processing has been studied and investigated in Table 3.1 and the general cloud 
computing risks has been identified as well as methods to identify these risks. The study now investigates the 
processes to address these risks by starting with the people aspect of data security namely the policies to manage 
information (Information Security Framework) and governance of the cloud environment moving on to the more 
technical areas of encryption, virtualisation and application security. 
3.3) Information Security Framework 
 
Data security has to be approached on an integrated basis across both the customer and the cloud service 
provider. To address the risk associated with the cloud environment a comprehensive approach to securing the 
cloud environment has to be followed consisting of a review and the implementing of an Information Security 
Framework, cloud  governance processes and the technical security measures.  
In this paper the security controls reviewed will be both from the view of the responsible party, being the controls 
that can be implemented during the data gathering process, as well as the controls that need to be present in the 
cloud service provider environment.  
The human element poses the greatest information security threat to any organisation and has been disregarded 
in the past (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007). The employees of an organisation are tasked to implement the policies and 
procedures designed by the organisation to control the associated risks. The risk that an employee might not 
comply with a key control is higher than the risk that a system, that is properly tested, would fail. The human 
element is complex as compliance breaches can be monitored but contrary to Information system monitoring this 
might happen after the breach has occurred as real-time monitoring of employees is difficult unless they interact 
with an IT system. This threat has to be addressed through policies implemented in the business and monitoring 
the output of the IT system. 
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The Information Security framework can be defined as a “comprehensive security model that ensures overall 
security of information there by eliminating business risks (Patil & Jagruti, 2008). 
Guidance on what should be included and addressed in an information security framework can be found in the 
International Organisation for Standardization framework ISO/IEC 27001 (International Organisation for 
Standardization, 2005) 
3.3.1) ISO/IEC 27001 - Information Security Management System 
 
The objective of the standard itself is to "provide requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and 
continuously improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS)”. Its adoption should be a strategic 
decision. The design and implementation of an organization's information security management system is 
influenced by the organization's needs and objectives, security requirements, the organizational processes used 
and the size and structure of the organization. 
ISO/IEC 27001 application results in the following objectives being attained: 
 Formulation of the security requirements and objectives of an organization; 
 Ensure cost effective management of security risk; 
 Legislative compliance with laws and regulations; 
 The statement can be used as a roadmap or process framework within an organization  for the 
implementation and management of controls resulting in the security objectives of an organization being 
attained; 
 identification and clarification of existing information security management processes; 
 use by the internal and external auditors of organizations to determine the degree of compliance with the 
policies, directives and standards adopted by an organization; 
 use by organizations to provide relevant information about information security policies, directives, 
standards and procedures to trading partners and other organizations with whom they interact for 
operational or commercial reasons;  
 implementation of business enhancing and supporting information security principles; 
 organizations can  provide relevant information about information security to customers. 
It is clear that developing an information security framework is to empower workforce and raise awareness 
regarding their responsibilities towards protecting the information assets of the business (Veiga & Eloff, 2007). 
Corporate governance is those processes, technologies, customs and policies that direct how a business is 
administered and controlled. By utilising the cloud computing environment a business has to hand over some 
form of control over the information to a party outside the organisation and to do this confidently the internal 
governance processes as well as those of the CSP has to be reviewed.  
3.4) Cloud Governance and Enterprise Risk Management  
 
The fundamental issues of governance and enterprise risk management in cloud computing focusses on the 
identification and implementation of appropriate organisational structures, processes and controls to effectively 
implement information security governance, risk management and compliance with legislation (Cloud Security 
Alliance, 2011). 
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Information security governance has to form part of an organisation’s overall corporate governance strategy and 
a well-designed information security governance process will result in security management programs that are 
scalable with the business as it grows, repeatable across different divisions of the business, sustainable, 
defensible and cost effective (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011). 
Both the cloud computing customer (responsible party) and the cloud service provider has to develop information 
security governance, regardless of the service or deployment model utilised. The collaboration between the two 
parties should be based on agreed-upon goals.  
The service model utilised may influence the defined roles and responsibilities in the collaborative information 
security governance and risk management (based on responsibilities defined) while the deployment model could 
influence the accountability. 
Prior to entering into a cloud computing agreement with a service provider a due diligence process has to be done 
by the responsible party (customer) and specific security control needs to be identified and tested. The cloud 
provider’s threat and breach detection capabilities has to be assessed and the continued implementation and 
maintenance of these processes has to be confirmed. 
As part of the collaborative information security governance metrics and standards for measuring performance 
has to be established and the customer will need to investigate how its own security governance and processes 
will be influenced by moving into a cloud environment. 
Risk management forms part of good governance and a thorough risk assessment has to be performed prior to 
moving a business into a cloud environment. As a minimum the risks identified earlier in this chapter has to be 
quantified and an appropriately measured by assigning an impact and a likelihood. This weighting assigned to 
each risk can to be increased or decreased as the controls and safeguards that the customer has insisted on in the 
SLA is taken into account as well as any other measures that will reduce the risk. 
The use of recognised information security governance frameworks like COBIT 5 and the following cloud security 
standards will enhance the clouds governance. 
 ISO/IEC 27017: Cloud Computing Security and Privacy Management System-Security Controls 
 ISO/IEC 27036-x: Multipart standard for the information security of supplier relationship management 
that is planned to include a part relevant to the cloud supply chain 
 ITU-T X.ccsec: Security guideline for cloud computing in telecommunication area 
 ITU-T X. Srfcts: Security requirements and framework of cloud based telecommunication service 
environment (X.srfcts) 
 ITU-T X.sfcse: Security functional requirements for Software as a Service (SaaS) application environment 
 
The management and governance of data requires that data be classified in terms of its sensitivity and uses as this 
will govern the information management policies that will be applied to it. The classification will also assign 
ownership and custodianship to the type of information and authorised access or limitations will be governed and 
designed accordingly (Ranchal, Bhargava, Othmane, Lilien, Kim & Kang, 2012). 
 
Both the Information security Framework and the cloud governance address the foundation of the securing of the 
cloud being policies and behaviour. The next part of the study addresses the technical security measures that can 
be used to secure the cloud. 
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3.5) Operating in the Cloud (Security measures) 
 
The security measures used differ based on the deployment and service model used in the cloud infrastructure 
under review. By first investigating the cloud architecture deployed the appropriate security themes and 
applications can be implemented. 
3.5.1) Cloud Architecture  
 
When reviewing the security in the cloud environment it is critical to analyse the structure of the cloud. Figure 3.5 
depicts the cloud architecture and the data security that is applicable to the layer of the architecture. The 
Infrastructure as a Service layer (IaaS) is the foundation of the cloud with the Platform as a Service (PaaS) built 
upon the IaaS and the Software as a Service layer sits upon the PaaS. These layers are related as they form part of 
the same cloud structure and the weaknesses in the security of one layer influences the security of all the layers 
(Che et al., 2011). 
Figure 3.5 – Cloud Architecture 
 
Source: Subashini & Kavitha, 2010 
The Cloud Computing Alliance (2011), explains the security interdependability of the different service models as 
follows: 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
24 | P a g e  
 
IaaS provides the maximum extensibility for customers which results in limited security other than the 
infrastructures own security functions. At the IaaS layer it is imperative that the cloud customer take charge of 
security operating systems, software applications and data contents. 
At the PaaS level customers can develop customised applications and build additional security into the 
applications and at the SaaS layer the security available is at the highest level and most integrated . 
The principle is clear that the lower the service layer is the more management duties and security capabilities 
have to be performed by the cloud customer. If a customer is only making use of the SaaS layer of a cloud the 
cloud service provider would need to satisfy the requirements security, monitor and compliance but if a customer 
uses the IaaS or PaaS layer the responsibility to discharge the cloud security requirements will be with the 
customer as the cloud service provider is only supplying “availability” and elementary security such as access 
control to hardware. 
The security responsibilities differ between cloud service models for example with Amazon’s Elastic Compute 
Cloud (EC2) (Amazon, 2010), included responsibility for securing the cloud to the hypervisor level. This results in 
the CSP only addressing physical security and virtualisation security. The user has to secure the OS, applications 
and data before it enters the part of the cloud infrastructure that the service provider takes responsibility for. 
The study will not investigate the different levels of security and data protection assumed by different service 
providers and will discuss and investigate the security measures form an academic view point. 
Different types of security will be discussed starting at the most detailed level being data encryption moving to 
secured virtualised environments and the security solutions that can be employed and on to application security 
and the different methods of identifying breaches in cloud security. The final part of the study will focus on 
Trusted Computing as based on Circle ID (2013) the perceived risk associated with cloud computing is too high for 
businesses to migrate to the cloud. 
3.5.2) Encryption 
 
In this section of the study focus will be on the technical aspects of securing data processing and communication 
in the cloud environment. The study is not exhaustive as a secure cloud can be achieved through various 
technologies and approaches but rather focussing on the general themes of encryption and continuing into data 
storage in the virtual environment and concluding with application security and intrusion detection solutions.  
3.5.2.1) Types of Encryption  
 
To secure the data in a cloud one of the main security measures is that of encryption both in the processing of 
data and in the storage of data. Encryption in its most basic form changes readable plaintext into an unreadable 
ciphertext. There are numerous different protocols to perform encryption. As part of the study we will be 
investigating the three basic encryption methods of hashing, symmetric cryptography and asymmetric 
cryptography. 
 Hashing Encryption 
Northcutt, (2008) states the fact that hash functions in cryptography is primarily to secure message integrity. The 
hash value provides a digital fingerprint that ensures that a message is not altered.  
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Hashing creates a unique fixed-length signature for a data set. Hashes are normally created with an algorithm and 
the hashes uniqueness to a set of data alerts the user to potential tampering. 
The difference between hashing and other forms of encryption is that the process of hashing cannot be reversed 
or decrypted after it has been done. If a hash is compromised it cannot be used to decrypt the original message. 
 Symmetric Methods (Private-Key Cryptography) 
This is the most basic form of encryption (excluding hashing that cannot decrypt or encrypt data) based on the 
premise that to read a set of data a “private key” is needed to decode the cipertext (Dhir, 2000). 
Private-Key encryption can be implemented in two ways namely a “stream” cipher and a “block” cipher 
dependant on the size of the data being encrypted or decrypted (Dhir, 2000).  
A “stream” cipher encrypts or decrypts data one character at a time as it is transmitted while a “block” cipher 
encrypts and decrypts blocks of data as it is transmitted (Dhir, 2000). 
Symmetric encryption algorithms like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ((FIPS), 2001) and International 
Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) (Leong, Cheung, Tsoi & Leong,2000) or Triple-DES (Dhir, 2000) can be used. 
The study into these different encryption algorithms is limited to understanding their working and application. 
Symmetric cipher manipulates data sets (blocks or streams) by adding, moving, deducting or assigning different 
values to the ciphertext using a key or numerous keys in different rounds of manipulation. The obvious weakness 
in this process is if the private key is compromised during attack but for unsophisticated attacks with limited 
computing power large bit encryption 128 and higher will result in secured information. 
The last part of the three encryption methods is asymmetric encryption.  
 Asymmetric Encryption 
Public key cryptography is more secure than symmetric methods of encryption. Cryptography of this nature uses 
two keys, a "private" key and a "public key," to perform encryption and decryption. The utilisation of two keys 
overcomes a major shortcoming of symmetric key cryptography, since a single key does not need to be securely 
managed among multiple users. (Wisegeek, 2013) 
In asymmetric cryptography, a public key is freely available to everyone and used to encrypt messages before 
sending them. A different, private key remains with the receiver of ciphertext messages, who uses it to decrypt 
them.  
A study of Fully Homomorphic encryption (Symmetric Encryption)will be performed as it is topical in the cloud 
environment where it will allow the CSP to perform data processing without being able to decrypt the data being 
processed an thus limiting any privacy compromises by the CSP. 
 Fully homomorphic encryption 
Ryan, 2012 states that with normal encryption data is encrypted before it is entered into the cloud. This limits the 
cloud provider’s ability to operate the data and results in the cloud being limited to a storage device. 
Homomorphic encryption allows the party that holds the ciphertexts to perform certain operations on the 
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cipertexts which mirrors the operations performed on the plain texts. In simple homomorphic encryption only 
one operation in the plaintext mirrors it in the ciphertexts. 
There is however limitations regarding full homomorphic encryption in the cloud environment. The cloud 
computation result will have as an output the encrypted result of the data operations. This limits any further 
processing the cloud can perform based on the results as it cannot decrypt the result. A second limitation is that 
“big data” running this type of security encryption will result in large amounts of duplication as data will stored 
and processed locally as well as encrypted and processed in the cloud (Ryan, 2012). 
Homomorphic encryption is a cipher solution where information stored and processing in the cloud needs to be 
isolated from the CSP due to its sensitivity. The two limitations mentioned above will need to be assessed and an 
additional constraint might be the network or Internet speed available in a country or area. If real-time 
computation is required this might not be a viable solution (Ryan, 2012). 
Encryption secures the data that moves over networks by securing and confirming the right counter party has 
received the information. When the data however enters the cloud virtualisation and processing and data storage 
needs to be secure. The study now investigates the applicable security methods to secure the virtual 
environment.   
3.5.3) Data Storage and Virtual Machines 
 
One underlying mechanism enabling cloud computing is virtualisation, be it at the hardware, middleware, or 
application level (Christodorescu & Sailer, 2009). 
Virtualization techniques are at the heart of Cloud Computing, and these techniques add their own vulnerabilities 
to those traditional in any connected computer system (Studnia, Alata, Deswarte, Kaâniche, Nicomette, 2012)  
Gartner (2011) indicates that in 2012 around 60% of the virtualized servers will be less secure than the physical 
servers they replace, hopefully dropping by to 30% by 2015. 
As the virtualization of infrastructure is such a large component of the cloud computing paradigm an investigation 
into different layers of virtualisation will be performed as well as touching on the building blocks of the virtual 
cloud and the security that can be implemented to secure the cloud.   
Studnia et al., 2012 discusses different kinds of virtualization and based on the needs of the user. : 
 Process Virtualisation: virtualizing this layer consists of providing an interface between an application 
and the underlying system. This allows for the programmer to create an application without being 
mindful of the specifications of the underlying operating systems it will run on as long as the 
application possess the correct virtualisation layer. 
 Server virtualisation: Virtualization is applied to the hardware. In the cloud computing scenario this 
will allow numerous operating systems to run simultaneously on the same physical machine. 
 Network virtualisation: VPN’s (Virtual Private Networks) is the most common and enables private 
networks to interconnect through public infrastructure like the Internet and VLANS’s (Virtual LAN’s) 
where local networks share distinct physical infrastructure. 
 Storage Virtualisation: SAN’s (Storage area networks) consist of data storage devices where large 
quantities of data from different users are isolated and stored on the same device. 
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In order to understand and investigate the security solutions that can be implemented to secure the virtual 
machines that constitute a cloud some terms has to be explored and explained: 
 Full Virtualisation – This type of virtualisation replicates a complete installation of one machine on 
another. The whole machine is thus replicated. The operating systems are unmodified and are only 
sharing hardware (Mishra, Mathur, Jain, Singh & Rathore, 2013). 
 
 Paravirtualization – This type of virtualisation allows multiple modified operating systems to run on a 
single server at the same time (Mishra et al., 2013). 
 
 Emulation – Similar to full virtualisation as unmodified operating systems are allowed to run, but with 
emulation the resources seen by the guest OS are completely simulated by software. The benefit of 
this configuration is that an operating system can be compiled on an architecture (virtualized) different 
from the architecture of a host. 
 
 Hypervisor Architecture - A computer tool allowing various software applications running on different 
OSs to coexist on the same server at the same time. This means that Windows, Java, Linux, C++, Simple 
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) can operate concurrently on the same machine. The hypervisor is the 
enabling technology for server virtualization (Studnia et al., 2012) and (Mishra et al., 2013). 
 
Hypervisors can be installed on two levels, the first being above the hardware as can be seen below or 
alternatively above the an operating system that is running on the host hardware. By taking the figure below and 
placing another level of OS between the hardware and the hypervisor. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 - Hypervisor placement in virtualised server environment 
 
 
 
Source: Studnia et al., 2012 
 
The different methods to virtualise a cloud will each have its own security challenges, but the design goals of the 
virtual system can be standardised. With these principles and goals in mind a list of the minimum security 
features can be investigated in section 3.4.3.1. 
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The design goals of a virtualised system are discussed below. The list is not complete as there could be physical 
attacks at the server source that has not been addressed in this work (el-Khameesy & Rahman 2012 p.970 - 974). 
 
 Accurate storage to ensure data is valid, accurate and complete which will result in data dependability. 
 Identification of data errors should be effective and the locating of a malfunctioning server should be a 
relatively easy process. 
 Continued data support resulting in data being as secure after being used (modified, deleted or 
appended) by users. 
 Monitoring to allow users to perform storage accuracy checks. 
 
By comparing these design goals to a virtual environment the implementation of security controls to address the 
weaknesses in the current system will become apparent.  
3.5.3.1) Virtualization Security 
 
The methods to secure the virtual environment are numerous and there are various technical solutions that can 
be implemented. The list below is of a general nature and solutions are available representing each of these 
security themes. 
Virtualization security should consist of the following (El-Khameesy & Rahman 2012 pp.970 - 974): 
 
 Authentication schemes provided by the OS should be evaluated. Systems that encrypt and authenticate 
communications should be preferred. 
 Secure access through authorisation list and strong password requirements. A two-factor authentication 
can be used combining usernames and passwords with secure tokens and biometrics. 
 Updating security and malware software based on published new threats such as the SANS Security Alert 
Consensus. 
 Logging and auditing controls should be implemented to serve as a deterrent to internal and external 
breaches. 
 Network security such as Firewalls and an IDS device that filters traffic has to be implemented. 
 Isolate the management of the virtualisation from the storage virtualisation. 
 Monitor unusual data flows and activities.  
 Implement port binding switches to prevent World Wide Name spoofing. The control is to bind the 
specific switch port allowing only connections of that device through the pre-defined port. 
 Disable access through insecure protocols like HTTP and force only secure encrypted communication 
through HTTPS. 
 
All of the above controls have to be monitored for effective implementation and continuity. 
By implementing the above principles a secure virtual environment could be secured but without effective 
monitoring new malware might render the current solutions obsolete in a short period of time.  
 
By effectively identifying breaches through VM monitoring the virtualised data base manager can protect the VM 
environment.  
3.5.3.2) VM Monitoring 
 
VM Monitoring is one solution to protect against the different possible attacks that can be performed in the 
virtualised environment.  
Below are some forms of VM monitoring and how it protects the virtual machines. 
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3.5.3.1) Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) 
 
VMI refers to techniques that allow the hypervisor to access virtual memory in order to analyse its content from 
the outside. The retrieval and analysis of data can be done directly in the hypervisor or from an outside dedicated 
virtual machine. There are limitations to this solution as the virtual machine monitor (VMM) does not have any 
knowledge of the principles used by the guest OS and cannot interpret the retrieved data. (Studnia et al., 2012) 
The limitation described above is the reason for the existence of a VMI and the additional controls they 
implement to monitor the guest OS. Some of the additional controls are: 
 Monitoring or interfering – can the VMI only monitor anomalies and report them or can it protect the 
VM by reacting to an attack. 
 Event reply – this allows the VMI to record the state the monitored virtual machine is in for further 
analysis similar to cloning to VM. 
The second process in using VM monitoring is Kernel Protection. 
3.5.3.2) Kernel Protection 
 
By virtualising the OS it is placed is a less privileged state as the hypervisor is assigned the highest privileges. This 
allows the hypervisor to enforce security on the OS. By implementing a VMM the hypervisor is limited to only 
executing approved code (Studnia et al., 2012). 
An example of this type of VMM is SecVisor (Studnia et al., 2012) which does not stop code from being added to 
the kernel, but it will not execute the code unless it is approved first. 
Another form of VM monitoring is “rootkit detection” and is explained below.  
3.5.3.3) Rootkit Detection 
 
The rootkit detection method is designed to detect rootkits hiding in the monitored OS without impacting the OS 
capabilities (Schultz, 2008). 
The process of rootkit detection requires the code of the virtualised OS to be market as non-executable, which 
then triggers an action from the hypervisor the first time the code is executed since it has been modified from its 
previous execution. The code is now compared with a database of known binaries. This results in the detection 
where code or binaries has been modified in the OS (Studnia et al., 2012). 
Another method of securing the data in the cloud is by saving data in different parts of the virtualised network. 
This is known as Data Dispersion and will hamper any attacks, but will also slow done the recovery of the data as 
time will be lost due to the parts of the date needing to be recovered. 
The storage of data in the virtual network has been investigated and if the responsible party uses SaaS the 
information source into the cloud will be a web browser. The study now investigates the application data security 
level of the cloud infrastructure and the possible mechanisms to use to secure this area. 
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3.5.4) Application security 
 
The two most common technologies to access the IaaS, Paas and SaaS services are through Web Services and 
Web Browsers (Jensen, Schwenk, Gruschka & Iacono, 2009). 
Web Service is used to provide access to IaaS infrastructure and Web Browsers are used for SaaS. In the PaaS 
environment both technologies can be found. 
3.5.4.1) Web Service and Browser Security  
 
The use of HTTPS together with WS Security should be the minimum when accessing the cloud (Ramgovind,  Eloff, 
& Smith, 2010). 
Jensen et al., (2009) investigates how to provide integrity, confidentiality and authentication in web services. 
Web browsers rely on different protocols to secure communication to the cloud. If these security measures are 
compromised the browser can allow unauthorised access into the cloud network.  
The securing of a browser is dependent on the integrity of the browser’s own code which can be managed with 
Origin Policy Controls and the second being to protect sensitive user data being accessed or modified by malware.  
 Origin Policies Controls 
Origin Policies limits and controls changes to the script to the original application (same domain, name, protocol 
and port) that created the script has to make changes to the script. (Karlof, Tygar, Wagner & Shankar, 2007). 
Separation of managed identities of the cloud consumer from those of the cloud provider must be ensured to 
protect the customer’s resources (information) from provider-authenticated entities that access that data (Jansen 
& Grance, 2011). 
 Web Authentication Protocols 
Standard protocols for communication between the browsers over the internet to the cloud have been studied 
and a short discussion on the most common protocols follows below. 
Web browsers use SOAP messages to communicate to the cloud, but by using XML Signature and XML Encryption 
these messages can be secured (Jensen et al., 2009) & (Jansen & Grance, 2011) 
The XML signature assigns an element to every message and this part is hashed and canonicalized (converting 
data into a standard format). This hashed element is added to the security header of the message. 
XML Encryption defines an encrypted key for transportation purposes. The most common encrypted key used is a 
hybrid encryption where an XML fragment is encrypted with a randomly symmetric key which then in itself is 
encrypted using a public key. In a SOAP message the encrypted key will appear in the header (Jensen et al., 2009).  
The terms SOAP and XML language is briefly discussed as it is such an important part of the controls over browser 
application security. 
 SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) – XML messaging framework designed to allow 
heterogeneous applications to exchange structured information in a distributed environment. SOAP 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
31 | P a g e  
 
usually relies on HTML (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) or SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) (Jansen 
& Grance , 2011). 
 
 XML (Extensible Markup Language) – Is a markup document language that defines the rules for 
encoding documents in a format that is both readable by humans and machines. The “markup” refers 
to a system of annotating a document which is distinguishable from the text through syntax’s. This 
results in the software carrying out operations on the text that is not displayed to the users. HTML 
(Hypertext Markup Language) results in pre-defined presentation semantics which results in 
specifications how structured data is to be presented (Jansen & Grance (2011).  
 
The next secure protocol that was studied is the Transport Layer Protocol which is extremely popular as HTTPS is 
based on this security verification system. 
 Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
TLS and its more common name Secure Sockets Layer are cryptographic protocols designed to secure 
communication over the Internet. HTTP over SSL is also known as HTTPS (Karlof et al., 2007) The security is based 
on X.509 certificates which assures counter party authentication and uses symmetric keys to exchange 
information (Jensen et al., 2009) and (Karlof et al., 2007). 
The Record Layer Encrypts or decrypts TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) data streams using keys agreed upon 
during the TLS Handshake (Authenticate server and client). 
The following is an example of how TLS will ensure Web browser security using encryption and authentication of 
network peers: 
Web server is configured using X.509 certificates that includes domain name. The certificate has to be issued by a 
“trusted” certification authority (CA). 
During the TLS Handshake the server sends the certificate to the browser. The browser verifies that the certificate 
has been issued by a “trusted” CA and that the domain name contained in the certificate matches the requested 
URL.  
As part of the study a short investigation into the components of TLS was done in order to better understand its 
workings. 
 X.509 – The ITU-T (International Telecommunications Union – Telecommunications Standardization 
Sector) standard for public key infrastructure. X.509 specifies standard formats for public key 
certificates, certificate revocation lists, attribute certificates and certification path validation 
algorithms.  
 Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) – Provides reliable, ordered, error-checked delivery of data 
between programs running on different computers connected to a LAN, intranet or the Internet. TCP 
thus guarantees that all bytes received by one computer will be equal to all bytes sent in the correct 
order. The method used to guarantee the secure transfer works on the bases that the receiver of the 
packet data will acknowledge receipt and a the sender keeps record of each packet sent as well as 
tracking the time elapsed since sending and receiving a positive confirmation back from the receiver. 
If a packet’s timer expires TCP will resend the packet of data.  
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The last method of securing the browser is the key translator in the browser. 
 Key translation in the browser 
This method of securing the browser requires that data is encrypted before being uploaded into the cloud and the 
data owner retains the key (Ryan, 2013). 
To protect a client from malicious software the connection to the cloud has to be authenticated. This cannot be 
done by XML tokens as browsers cannot generate cryptographic tokens. A trusted third party help is needed to 
generate the security required. When the browser cannot authenticate a user a HTTP redirect is sent to the third 
party who authenticates the details of the “log-in” and supplies the browser with another HTTP message to allow 
access.  
The downside to this type of encryption is that it limits the processing that the CSP can perform as he never has 
any access to the decrypted data and the results in the cloud being limited to a storage and forwarding tool.  
Intrusion detection in the cloud environment is important to the responsible party or user as control over the 
data is given to the CSP and unless the responsible party or user is informed of any breaches to corrective action 
can be taken. Attacks can originate inside or outside the organisation. To allow the user some form of comfort 
that data is secured the CSP has to implement reporting software or hardware to inform the CSP that an attack 
happened or is currently happening.  
3.5.5) Cloud Intrusion Detection 
 
The goal of intrusion detection is to identify, preferably in real time, unauthorised use, misuse, and abuse of 
computer systems by both systems insiders and external penetrators (Mukherjee, Heberlein & Levitt, 1994). 
Intrusion detection is defined to be the problem of identifying individuals who are using a computer system 
without authorisation and those who have legitimate access to the system but are abusing their privileges (insider 
threats). 
Possible attacks at the network layer of cloud computing are IP Spoofing, DNS Poisoning, man-in-the-middle 
attack (MITM) or port scanning (Modi, Patel, Patel & Rajarajan, 2012). A short study into these types of attacks is 
necessary to form an understanding how the cloud can be compromised.  
 IP Spoofing – The attacker creates Internet Protocol (IP) packets from a fraudulent source IP address. The 
header of each IP packet contains the source and destination address and by manipulating the source the 
attacker can create the appearance that the IP was sent from a different computer (Modi et al., 2012). 
 DNS (Domain Name System) Poisoning (“Pharming” attacks) – An attacker insert a fake address record 
for an Internet domain into the DNS. The server accepts the fake record and subsequent requests for the 
address of the domain are answered with the server controlled by the attacker (Modi et al., 2012). 
 Man-in-the-Middle attacks - The attacker creates the illusion to independent connections that they are 
talking to one another where they are actually communicating to the MITM. Information is requested 
form the connections and fraudulently used (Modi et al., 2012). 
 Port Scanning – This type of attack dispatches client requests to a range of server port addresses on a 
host, with the goal of finding an active port exploiting a known vulnerability of that service (Modi et al., 
2012). 
A study of the different types of intrusion detection software and ideas are set out below. 
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Intrusion detection can be performed at the network, host or application layer. In the figure below the possible 
working of an intrusion detection and prevention system can be seen. 
Figure 3.7 – A layered-taxonomy of IDPS 
 
Source: Patel, Taghavi, Bakhtiyari, & Júnior, 2013  
Based on figure 3.7 there are two types of intrusion detection software. Intrusion Detection Software (IDS) 
automates the intrusion detection process where as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) is either 
a software or hardware device that has all the capabilities of an IDS system but can also attempt to stop possible 
incidents (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). 
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The working of intrusion detection software or hardware is based on the premise that an intruder’s actions and 
behaviour will be notably different from a legitimate user. 
IDS requires that the model or also called signatures of intrusion is defined resulting in the IDS knowing what to 
look for. There are two types of models. The first is called an “anomaly” detection model and the second is the 
“misuse” detection model (Patel et al., 2013). 
3.5.6.1) Anomaly Detection Model 
 
This model bases its detection parameters on the user or group of user’s normal behaviour. The IDS will 
statistically analyse the user’s current session, comparing it to the profile representing the user’s normal 
behaviour and will flag significant deviations or anomalies (Patel et al., 2013). 
3.5.6.2) Integrating Signature Intrusion detection Software (Misuse detection model) 
 
This model compares the user’s session and/or command against a pre-defined set of signatures/ or attributes 
that attackers use to penetrate a system. If a pattern is identified that is known to cause security problems the 
session is flagged. This form of detection is not as effective due to the time lag between new threats being 
introduced by penetrators and the list of signatures and attributes being updated in the IDS software (Patel et al., 
2013). 
3.5.6.3) Monitoring data access 
 
There are two broad types of software that can assist the CSP in this regard. The use of Database Activity 
Monitoring (DAM) software and File Activity Software (FAM) will highlight the fact that data has been moved into 
the cloud from the local network. 
Database Activity Monitoring software refers to a suite of tools that can be used to support the ability to identify 
and report fraudulent, illegal or undesirable behaviour, with minimum impact on user operations and productivity 
(Gartner IT Glossary, 2013). 
File Activity Software can identify excessive user access, audit file access based on user rights as well as alert the 
business if user requests violate corporate policies. 
An additional protection is the use of URL (Uniform Resource Locator) filters where the interface with the cloud is 
only available to authorised personal in a business. The administrative interfaces for the cloud would use a 
different URL than the consumption/user would use and the URL filter can distinguish between the different 
URL’s to allow user access. 
3.5.6.4) Data Loss Prevention Software (DLP) 
 
The difference between IDS and DLP is that DLP software identifies sensitive and critical data and  either blocks 
this data from being communicated over a network or alternatively allow the communication but flag it as a  
breach to the administrator (SANS Institute Data Loss Prevention, 2008). 
A DLP system requires that information to be monitored be designated as sensitive as all communication will not 
be monitored. Each business will have unique parameters as to what type of information it identifies as sensitive, 
but for the purposes of this work the definition of “personal data” as defined in The Protection of Personal 
Information Bill could be used as a guideline. 
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The DLP solution can monitor activity in different areas or actions in a network, either when data is moving over 
the network, data that is stored (saved) or during e-mail conversations. 
These three areas where sensitive data are monitored are now discussed and graphically depicted in figures 3.8 
and 3.9.  
 Data on the move – Monitoring of all data traffic moving over lines leaving the internal network of the 
business. The monitoring takes place as soon as data is communicated outside of the businesses internal 
network. The sensitivity level of the data will either trigger the DLP process or allow the data to be 
communicated and flag it or block the communication.  
Figure 3.8 - How a DLP monitors while data is moving over a network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SANS Institute Data Loss Prevention, 2008 (Amended) 
 
 
A further control that the DLP process allows a business is that of limiting data to leave the network via USB or 
other storage devices. The DLP could monitor all data leaving the network via communication over a network or 
to a physical device. This monitoring of physical devices is called Data End Points monitoring and it is briefly 
discussed below. 
 Data at end points – This application is installed on end user workstations and laptops monitoring 
any data leaving via removable devices such as USB drives. Additional to monitoring devices it 
provides auditing logging and protection against users printing sensitive data. 
 
 Data stored – Applies to monitoring databases and files to identify sensitive data stored in areas of the 
network where the security is insufficient or copies of sensitive data stored by an unauthorised person. The 
DLP will scan databases for designated sensitive data and when a copy of these sensitive files are found in a 
area that has not been designated the database administrator will be informed. Some DLP software 
solutions will even move a sensitive file to a different secure location if the monitoring activity has flagged 
that the file is at risk. 
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 E-Mail Transmissions - In Figure 3.9 the working of DLP monitor regarding e-mails are depicted. In regards 
to electronic mails the standard transmission protocol of SMPT (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol – most 
common standard for email transmissions across the internet – text based where recipients of 
communication are specified and verified that they exist.) and integrating into message transfer agent 
(MTA-software that transfers electronic messages from one computer to another) any message is 
intercepted by the DLP at the outgoing mail server and then re-rooted for inspection prior to being sent to 
the MTA for communication outside the network. 
Figure 3.9 - How a DLP monitors e-mail transmissions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SANS Institute Data Loss Prevention, 2008 
 
Mackay, Baker & Al-Yasiri, (2012) investigated the reasons why there has not been a massive move to cloud 
computing infrastructure and found that the customers does not trust the cloud service providers sufficiently to 
move their information into the cloud. A solution to obtain the trust required to move data or processing into the 
cloud is to implement a “Trusted Computing Platform” into the network. 
3.5.6) Trusted Computing platforms 
 
Mackay et al., (2009) introduces the concept of Trusted Platform Computing. Trusted Computing (TC) is a 
specialised field of trusted systems whereby a device is made to behave in a consistent, predictable manner 
enforced by hardware and software techniques such as cryptography and automated authentication (Trusted 
Computing Group, 2011). TC ensures that only authorised code runs on a system and this ensures critical data is 
protected. 
In the cloud environment trusted computing will be implemented through encrypted data storage, memory 
curtaining (Hardware enforced memory isolation where different programs cannot read data from one programs 
memory to another) and specialised TPM (Trusted Platform Module) architecture to securely virtualise 
environments (Ryan, 2013). 
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In the cloud environment TC allows a cloud to authenticate it to other known machines. The security measures 
that TC uses can unfortunately also prevent and restrict access for users and systems that are valid, but does not 
follow the requirements of the TC environment. 
TC requires six key technology concepts to fully encompass a fully trusted system. They are as follows: 
Endorsement keys, secure input and output, Memory curtaining/protected execution, sealed storage, remote 
attestation and trusted third party support (Trusted Computing Group, 2011). 
A TPM module is a special purpose microcontroller or chip that is designed to interface with standard 
hardware/software and is usually surface mounted on the motherboard of a PC. The TPM chip access the main 
bus of the computer which then allows it to track and report on the configuration state of the entire computer. By 
being able to report the state the computer was in when encryption was being performed the chip guarantees 
that security during the specified process. For example if a computer is used in a certain “trustworthy” state the 
TPM can then grant access to encryption keys as well as communicating to other computers in the cloud or 
network that it is currently being operated in this trustworthy state. As part of the TPM functionality it will include 
command infrastructure and protocols to migrate data between trusted devices (Trusted Computing Group, 
2011) and (Ryan, 2013). 
The trusted computing platform supplies a viable option regarding securing the cloud and the sensitive 
information that might be processed or stored. It consists of parts of security architecture like hashing and secure 
data storage that has been investigated earlier in the chapter and the only differentiating characteristic is that a 
TPM can be used to secure the execution of commands (Trusted Computing Group, 2011). 
This effectiveness of this solution will depend on the cloud model as a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) user will 
probably not be interested in this type of security.  
Figure 3.10 represents a typical trusted platform. The security controls are similar to the list of controls proposed 
to secure the cloud environment in Chapter 3 with the addition of the “Secure Execution Engine” that is in the 
form of a TPM.  
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Figure 3.10 – Trusted Computing Module 
 
 
Source: Trusted Computing Group, 2011 
Based on the investigation conducted in Chapter 3 there are numerous methods to secure the cloud. The study 
has identified the requirements for data security in Table 3.1 and based on these the investigation was 
performed. 
The investigation resulted in the following findings:  
 Securing the cloud computing environment requires more than just a technical approach and ideally and 
integrated data security plan will have to be implemented. This would include IT governance processes, 
IT risk identification as well as an Information Security Framework.  
 The human element and interaction regarding data security is as important as the technical data security 
controls implemented by a business. Humans are tasked to implement the controls and if there is no 
supporting policies and procedures such as an Information Security Framework they pose a similar risk to 
sensitive data being accessed without authorisation from outside the business. 
 The security safeguards requirement of the POPI Bill can be discharged by implementing encryption, 
virtual machine monitoring, application security, cloud intrusion detection and possibly moving to 
trusted computing. The level and complexity of the technical controls that a business has to implement 
will depend on the deployment model and service model used, the cloud service provider own controls 
and the sensitivity level of the data that is processed or stored in the cloud. 
 Due to the penalties imposed by the POPI Bill business will have to increase the security controls 
regarding sensitive data. This will result in additional cost as more sophisticated measures might be 
required to secure data in the cloud. 
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 The mistrust of businesses of cloud service providers regarding the recoverability of data, corruption or 
up-time will result in additional cost as organisations try to protect themselves through a SLA. 
 The physical placement of the cloud servers could result in the CSP and the client having different 
business objectives. The CSP will place the physical infrastructure in the country where communication 
costs are the lowest to increase profitability, but the client will require that the servers are located in a 
country with the same or increased level of privacy legislation. 
The data security controls that can be implemented to secure data are dependent on the cloud infrastructure as 
the risks and solutions associated with every cloud will differ. Securing data in the IT environment is not new and 
numerous solutions are available but cloud computing does add some complexity in regards to sensitive personal 
information as the risk is as high from outside attack as it is from the CSP using the without authorisation.  
The additional risk  of compliance with  the promulgated POPI Bill will now be investigated and based on the 
findings in Chapter 3 an understanding of what will be required to comply with the requirements will be attained.     
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Chapter 4 – Implications on the Cloud Computing environment of the proposed 
Protection of Personal Information Bill 
 
4.1) An Introduction to The Protection of Personal Information Bill  
 
The South African National Assembly passed the Protection of Personal Information Bill (POPI) on 20 August 2013 
after more than 4 years of deliberation (Cornish, 2013). 
The Protection of Personal Information Bill aims to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by ensuring 
that organisations process personal information in a fair, responsible and secure manner. The impact of this Bill 
on responsible parties and cloud service providers has to be investigated as an increased number of businesses 
embark on using cloud computing to process sensitive information. The Bill assigns responsibilities and specific 
requirements, to both the responsible party and the cloud service provider, and the study will highlight these 
major requirements and refer the reader to the relevant data security controls that can be implemented to 
discharge some of these requirements. 
Organisations that fail to safeguard the personal information of customers, employees and other stakeholders 
could find themselves facing civil liability claims, criminal and regulatory sanctions and significant reputational 
damage. 
The purpose of the Bill is two-fold, enhancing local privacy regulation as well as prescribing data protection 
practices in South Africa that are on par with international practices (PWC, 2011). 
The responsibilities in term of the Bill to comply with the “Conditions for lawful processing of personal 
information” rests with two parties namely the “responsible party” and the “operator” (see definitions below as 
per the Bill). 
As the cloud computing paradigm shift is taking place and more and more entities are contemplating a move into 
virtualization and cloud services the legislation governing especially the services provided by the “Operators” 
(Cloud Providers) are increasingly more topical as the benefits of scalability and cost reduction can be reduced if 
the compliance burden is too high. 
In order to understand the implications of the proposed Bill a clear understanding of the services, their 
deployment (structurally and geographically) as well as the information security protections employed by a 
service provider has to be obtained. In the case where a principle service provider relies on sub-contractors the 
same assurances and warranties will have to be in place as with the principle service provider. 
The different international legislation has assisted South Africa in compiling the POPI Bill and below we will study 
the different contributing Act’s and principles the legislators has used to base the South African legislation on. 
4.1.1) Processing Personal Information in Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
Historically the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) compiled “Recommendations of 
the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data” 
(PWC, 2011). The European Union has adopted these recommendations, whereas the USA has opted to 
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promulgate sector specific bills regarding personal data protection as can be seen below (Heyink, 2012) and 
(Sotto, Treacy & McLellan, 2010): 
 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Also known as the Financial Services Modernisation Act) requires financial 
institutions to protect the non-public personal information of financial consumers from disclosure. 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and the Health Information Technology 
for economic and clinical Health Act (“HITECH”) govern the protection of personal health-related 
information. 
 Sarbannes Oxley (“SOX”) governs internal controls over financial disclosures and the Federal Information 
Security Management Act (“FISMA”) governs how federal agencies are required to protect personal 
information. 
 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and Fair Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) requires 
consumer credit reporting agencies to implement reasonable procedures that are fair and equitable to 
the consumer with regard to the following principles of confidentiality, accuracy, relevance and utilisation 
in the use of personal information.  
 
The most important piece of legislation in regards to cloud computing is the “Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intersect and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001” (the US Patriot Act”) 
which in its most basic application requires any data holder to allow access to the federal government to any 
information held by that organisation in the United States. This Act has profound implications as many cloud 
computing platforms and applications used on tablets and mobile technologies are supported by cloud computing 
facilities situated in the USA and this Act obligates these platforms to allow access to the sensitive information 
they might hold (Heyink 2012). Chapter 9 of the Bill is dedicated to cross border information flows.  
 
The impact of this foreign legislation influenced the South African Bill as it is based on these foreign acts, but it 
also places in increased compliance burden on users of the cloud computing environment as compliance with the 
local Bill will have to be supplemented with knowledge of where your service provider is housing the data centre 
and the legal requirements in that country. 
The principle identified regarding different legislation in different countries and legislative jurisdictions is that 
processing and storage of data in a cloud can be performed if the country/ legislative jurisdiction have similar or 
stricter laws than the country the data subject is resident in and the data was gathered assuming there is no 
adverse legislative requirements in those foreign countries. 
How the “strictness” of legislation would be measured is a legal question and beyond the scope of this study but 
it does allow the possibility to move data into the cloud on the premise and assurance that the laws governing the 
cloud service provider is more stringent and will thus result in more protection for the data subject than what the 
data subject would have had in the country of origin. 
To understand and explore the requirements of the Bill some of the definitions of the Bill have to be explored as 
their meaning is integral in understanding the requirements and responsibilities that the Bill assigns the different 
parties in the date gathering and processing process. 
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4.1.2) Important POPI Bill Definitions 
 
The following definitions form part of Chapter 1 of the Bill (Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009): 
Table 4.1 – POPI Definitions 
 
Words defined in POPI Bill Definition 
 
“personal information” 
means information relating to an identifiable, living, natural person, and 
where it is applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic person, including, but 
not limited to— 
 
(a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or 
mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth of the person; 
 
(b) information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or 
employment history of the person; 
 
(c) any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, 
telephone number or other particular assignment to the person; 
 
(d) the blood type or any other biometric information of the person; 
 
(e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person; 
 
(f) correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a 
private or confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal 
the contents of the original correspondence; 
 
(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the person; and 
 
(h) the name of the person if it appears with other personal information 
relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would reveal 
information about the person; 
 
“operator” means a person who processes personal information for a responsible party 
in terms of a contract or mandate, without coming under direct authority of 
that party; 
“record” means any recorded information- 
(a) regardless of form or medium, including any of the following:  
(1) Writing on any material; 
(2) information produced, recorded or stored by means of any 
tape-recorder, computer equipment, whether hardware or 
software or both, or other device, and any material 
subsequently derived from information so produced, 
recorded or stored; 
(3) label, marking or other writing that identifies or describes 
anything of which it forms part, or to which it is attached by 
any means; 
(4) book, map, plan, graph or drawing; 
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Words defined in POPI Bill Definition 
(5) photograph, film, negative, tape or other device in which 
one or more visual images are embodied so as to be 
capable, with or without the aid of some other equipment, 
of being reproduced; 
(b) in the possession or under control of a responsible party; 
(c) Whether or not it was created by a responsible party; and 
(d) regardless of when it came into existence; 
 
“responsible party” means a public or private body or any other person which , alone or in 
conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for 
processing personal information; 
 
“processing” means any operation or activity or any set of operations, whether or not by 
automatic means, concerning personal information, including- 
(a) the collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, 
updating or modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 
(b) dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making 
available in any other form; or 
(c) merging, linking, as well as restriction, degradation, erasure or 
destruction of information; 
 
“account number” for the purposes of section 105 (refer 4.3.1) means any unique identifier that 
has been assigned- 
(a) to one data subject only; or 
(b) jointly to more than one data subject, 
by a financial or other institution which enables the data subject, referred to 
in paragraph (a), to access his, her or its own funds or to access credit 
facilities or which enables a data subject, referred to in paragraph (b), to 
access joint funds or to access joint credit facilities.   
 
Source: Compiled from the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 
In terms of this study the “operator” as defined and the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) are the same party 
responsible for data processing and data storage in the cloud. 
The Bill sets out eight conditions that are closely aligned with the international principles of data protection. In 
the table below these principles are discussed with the relevant implications on the responsible party (RP) and 
the cloud service provider (CSP).  
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Table 4.2 – Summary of POPI Bill Principles 
Principle/ 
“Condition” 
Discussion Impact on Responsible Party Impact on Cloud Service Provider 
Accountability The responsible party 
must ensure that the 
principles contained in 
the POPI Bill and all the 
measures that give 
effect to the principles 
are complied with. 
The onus is on the responsible 
party (RP) to ensure 
accountability. 
No direct effect on the cloud 
service provider (CSP), but the 
responsible party will require that 
the SLA between the two parties 
confirms that the CSP complies 
with the requirements of the Bill. 
Processing 
Limitation 
Personal information 
may only be processed 
in a fair and lawful 
manner with the 
consent of the 
individual. 
The responsible party needs to 
obtain consent of the data 
subject to process information.  
Personal Information may only 
be collected directly from the 
data subject.  
The cloud service provider will 
receive information from the 
responsible party but will have no 
responsibility that the 
requirements of the Bill are 
adhered to. 
Purpose 
Specification 
Personal information 
may only be processed 
for specific, explicit 
defined and legitimate 
reasons. 
The responsibility party can 
only collect data for a specific 
purpose and the data subject 
has to be aware of the purpose. 
The CSP has to ensure that 
records are not retained for 
longer than necessary and has to 
guard against processing data 
that is not in line with the original 
purpose.  
Further 
processing 
limitation 
Personal information 
may not be processed 
for a second purpose 
unless that processing is 
compatible or 
supplementary to the 
original purpose. 
The RP has to ensure that no 
further processing of the data 
takes place that is not in line 
with its original purpose of 
collection. As the processing 
will primarily take place in the 
cloud the SLA will have to 
specify which data is collected 
for which purchase. 
The CSP processing will be 
governed by the SLA with the RP.  
Information 
Quality 
Responsible parties 
must ensure that 
personal information is 
kept reliable, accurate 
and up-to-date. 
The RP has to take reasonable 
steps to ensure personal 
information is complete, 
accurate, not misleading and 
updated where necessary. 
The CSP cloud security and data 
integrity controls will have to be 
scrutinised by the RP. For a data 
subject to be able to update 
personal information there has to 
be a link from the web interface 
where information is gathered by 
the RP to the cloud to allow 
information to be corrected. 
Openness Regulator and the data 
subject to be aware that 
personal information is 
being collected by the 
responsible party. 
The RP must maintain the 
documentation of all processing 
operations under its 
responsibility in terms of 
section 14 of the Bill or section 
51 of the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act (17). 
The onus to inform the data 
subject of collection rest with the 
RP and the CSP will not be 
impacted by this requirement. 
 
Section 18(1) (g) requires that the 
RP informs the data subject of the 
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Principle/ 
“Condition” 
Discussion Impact on Responsible Party Impact on Cloud Service Provider 
The RP has to notify the data 
subject that personal 
information is being collected  
and where the source of the 
information is a third party 
inform the data subject of the 
source it is being collected 
from.  
 
fact that the RP intends to 
transfer the information to 
another country or international 
organisation and the level of 
protection of personal 
information afforded by that 
country or international 
organisation. 
Security 
Safeguards 
Personal information 
must be kept secure 
against risk of loss, 
unauthorised access, 
interference, 
modification, 
destruction or 
disclosure. 
See responsible party 
responsibilities in Section 4.2 of 
this chapter. 
See Cloud Service Provider 
responsibilities in Section 4.3 of 
this chapter. 
Data subject 
participation 
Data subjects may 
request the correction 
or deletion of any 
personal information 
held about them that 
may be inaccurate, 
misleading or outdated. 
The RP has to allow a data 
subject access to his/her 
personal information.  
The RP must create an 
application or system whereby 
a data subject can access data 
in the cloud and correct it. 
The CSP has to secure the 
interface with the application or 
system. Due to the fact that 
personal information could be 
processed in the cloud of 
thousands of data subjects the 
verification and granting of access 
will be complex and will result in 
additional costs to the CSP and 
RP. 
Source: Compiled from the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 
For data to be lawfully processed all eight conditions as set out by Bill has to be met.  
The onus is on the responsible party to ensure that all the conditions in the Bill is met, and this can only be done 
by adhering to the requirements when gathering data and transferring data to and from the cloud. The cloud 
service provider has to manage the data security and integrity requirements when data is received, stored, 
processed and transferred.  
The responsibilities placed on each party are clear and the apparent solutions to these responsibilities will now be 
explored. The discussions below will be based on the premise that the responsible party is making use of a cloud 
service provider to store and process sensitive data. 
4.2) Impact on Responsible Parties 
 
The responsibility of the responsible party is well defined in the Bill and to discharge the obligations as set out in 
the Bill the principles has to be complied with. 
The impact on the Responsible party is twofold in that data processing and collection has to be secure in the local 
network (responsible party’s network) and transmission between the cloud and the local network has to be 
secure. 
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The requirements are primarily situated in section 19 to 22 and are grouped under the “Security Safeguards” 
condition of the Bill (Heyink, 2012). 
The discussion will comprise of the stating of the requirement as it is in the Bill followed by possible solutions as 
to how a responsible party could discharge the requirements of the Bill. 
The first requirement is regarding security measures to ensure information integrity. 
Section 19 of the Bill states: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the cloud computing environment a major portion of the implications of section 19 will be outsourced to the 
cloud service provider, but in terms of Section 21 the responsibility is with the responsible party to enter into a 
“written contract” which ensures the responsible party that the required security measures are established and 
maintained. 
These legal complexities of these contractual agreements are outside of the scope of this work and focus will be 
limited to the minimum requirements that a responsible party has to confirm in writing to manage the 
responsibility assigned by the Bill.  
 
 
 
Section 19: (1) A responsible party must secure the integrity and confidentiality of personal information in its 
possession or under its control by taking appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational 
measures to prevent- 
(a) loss of, damage to or unauthorised destruction of personal information; and 
(b) Unlawful access to or processing of personal information 
(c) Regularly verify that the safeguards are effectively implemented; and 
(d) ensure that the safeguards are continually updated in response to new risks or 
deficiencies in previously implemented safeguards. 
(2) In order to give effect to subsection (1), the responsible party must take reasonable measures 
to- 
(a) identify all reasonable foreseeable internal and external risks to personal information in 
its possession or under its control; 
(b) Establish and maintain appropriate safeguards against the risk identified;  
(3) The responsible party must have due regard to generally accepted information security 
practices and procedures which may apply to it generally or be required in terms of specific 
industry or professional rules and regulations. 
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4.2.1) Service Level Agreements with Cloud Providers 
 
The Service Level Agreement between a responsible party and a cloud service provider is one of the most 
important defences a responsible party has in limiting the risk assigned to the responsible party by the Bill. This is 
“written contract “is specifically required by Section 21 (1) and the responsible party has to monitor that the 
operator (CSP) establishes and maintains the security measures agreed to. 
Section 21 of the Act states: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to the different cloud computing models and the various different parties that may provide the cloud 
infrastructure and/or a platform as a service or software as a service the list of requirements are not exhaustive 
and focus is on the general principles that need to be addressed following from the requirements of the Bill.  
The following should be addressed in the contract between the cloud service provider and the responsible party. 
(Heyink, 2012) 
 Any confidentiality requirements that the responsible party has agreed to with the data subject. This will 
be based on the data the responsible party has designated as sensitive; 
 Records management. The format records and process results are held, retrieving protocols and any 
possible legal requirements on the responsible party. The legal admissibility of documents could depend 
on the format and security under which it is held; 
 Record destruction and retention. The terms will have to be agreed between the two contracting parties 
as to the periods that document back-ups should be kept, the notice period given to the cloud provider 
when a document or data needs to be retrieved out of the data archives and the period that back-ups 
will be held by the cloud service provider; 
 Sub-contractors will need to be identified and the same processing and confidentiality assurances need 
to be agreed upon that is applicable to the principle cloud service provider; 
 Verification and audit of agreed upon security processes will need to be captured in the contract as the 
responsibility to ensure that there are proper security protocols and that that are implemented and 
maintained rests with the responsible party; 
 Service levels have to be agreed between the contracting parties for example (up-time, server response 
time, and cost per measurable unit); 
 A review of the Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery plans (DRP) of both the Cloud provider and the 
sub-contractor has to be done as well as confirming how a major event will impact on the responsible 
parties business. Regular tests and simulations of the “switch over” moment have to be done to confirm 
an active DRP. 
Section 21  (1) A responsible party must, in terms of a written contract between the responsible party and the 
operator, ensure that the operator which processes personal information for the responsible party 
establishes and maintains the security measures referred to in section 19. 
(2) The operator must notify the responsible party immediately where there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the personal information of a data subject has been accessed or acquired by any 
unauthorised person. 
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The only method available to the responsible party to obtain the required assurance that the cloud provider has 
implemented and is maintaining the agreed/required level of security controls is to obtain independent 
assurance. 
4.2.2) Assurance Reports 
 
In order to discharge the responsibilities of the responsible party in terms of the Bill the responsible party can 
make use of the SAS 70/ISAE 3402 Auditing Standard regarding Assurance Reports on Controls at a Service 
Organization. The Standard supplies an independent review of controls, either enhancing a cloud provider’s 
credibility or highlighting potential inadequacies (NDB Accountants & Consultants, 2008). 
In terms of ISAE (International Standards on Assurance Engagements) the assurance provider can either receive a 
Type I or Type II report. Type I refers to assurance over the design and implementation of controls and the Type II 
report provides assurance over the effective operation of controls for a defined period (NDB Accountants & 
Consultants, 2008). 
The assurance report can provide the required assurance to discharge the requirement set out in section 20 of 
the Bill. 
The Bill places the responsibility on the responsible party to secure the integrity and confidentiality of personal 
information by taking appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational measures to prevent data loss or 
manipulation (POPI, 2009). 
When the processing and/or storage of data is outsourced to an operator (CSP) the responsibility is still with the 
responsible party and the only remedy available is to discharge his responsibilities by using an appropriate SLA 
and confirming independently that the appropriate controls are implemented and maintained by the operator 
(CSP). 
Due to the fact that most of the cloud service providers are based outside the South African borders an additional 
legislative requirement has to be addressed. Chapter 9 is focused on Trans-Border Information Flow and 
particular the provision that a responsible party cannot transfer personal information about a data subject to a 
third party outside the Republic unless there is a binding agreement and the foreign country upholds the 
principles of lawful processing. 
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4.2.3) Trans-border Information Flows 
 
Chapter 9 of the Bill deals with trans-border information flows.  
Section 72 (1) reads as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The legislative requirement that flows from this section is the requirement that a data subject has to give consent 
for their data to be transferred across borders. This consent will need to be obtained at the point where data is 
gathered. This requires the responsible party to plan into the future and amend the current data gathering 
processes to include this permission requirement. 
Section 72 (1) A responsible party in the Republic may not transfer personal information about a data subject to a third 
party who is a foreign country unless- 
(a) the third party who is the recipient of the information is subject to a law, binding corporate rules, binding 
agreement or memorandum of understanding entered into between two or more public bodies, which provide an 
adequate level of protection that- 
(i) Effectively upholds principles for reasonable processing of the information that are substantially similar to 
the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information relating to a data subject who is a natural 
person and, where applicable, a juristic person; and 
 (ii) includes provisions, that are substantially similar to this section, relating to the further transfer of 
personal information from the recipient to third parties who are in a foreign country;  
(b) the data subject consents to the transfer; 
(c) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the responsible party, 
or for the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken in response to the data subject’s request; 
(d) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data 
subject between the responsible party and the a third party; or 
(e) the transfer is for the benefit of the data subject , and- 
 (i) it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the consent of the data subject to that transfer; and 
 (ii) if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the data subject would be likely to give it. 
Section 72 (2) Where the transfer of personal information, as referred to in subsection (1), is made in terms of a 
non-binding memorandum of understanding the public body remains accountable for the purposes of this Act 
for the protection of the personal information. 
Section 72 (3) has a definition for “accountable” as it is used in section (2) above: 
“accountable” means that where the recipient of the information , who is a party to a non-binding memorandum 
of understanding, processes the personal information of a data subject in a manner that would have constituted 
an interference with the privacy of the data subject in terms of this Act had the information been processed in the 
Republic, the processing will be regarded as an interference with the privacy  of the data subject in terms of this 
Act and will be regarded as having been processed by the responsible party. 
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The second requirement that flows out of this part of the Bill is that the local legislative requirement of the 
country where the operator (CSP) is situated has to be on the same standard as the promulgated POPI Bill. This is 
a technical legal requirement and an expert needs to be contacted to either confirm or disprove the level of 
legislation. It is unlikely that a CSP can give any assurance in this regard. 
4.2.4) Obtaining permission 
 
The responsible party will have to obtain the consent of the data subject to comply with the second condition of 
“Processing Limitation”. The Bill does not however require that the consent of the data subject to be in writing. 
This result in processing being lawful if that data subject had the opportunity to object to the use of his/her 
personal information and fails to do so. In legal terms consent may be inferred (Heyink, 2011). 
4.2.5) Securing data being transferred to and from the cloud 
 
Based on the study into technical data security field in Chapter 3 the responsible party will have to secure the 
local network as well as all gateways in and out of the home network to the cloud. 
The responsible party will have to implement an Information Security Framework with the appropriate level of 
Cloud Governance as well as technical security solutions to secure the different infrastructure in the network. 
Due to the different configurations that can be used to build the interface with the cloud environment the 
securitisation of the data is fairly complex. Based on the cloud infrastructure and the service models that the 
responsible party a combination of solutions discussed in Chapter 3 can be implemented. 
As an example: If the responsible party uses the SAAS service model and data is thus gathered from the data 
subject and passed into the cloud via a web browser the security available to secure the data gathering (web-
browser security) as well as encryption and data storage controls has to be implemented. These will be addressed 
by the CSP and not the responsible party. 
If the responsible party uses only the IAAS service model the responsible party will need to secure the data 
gathering by implementing control over the gathering of data as well as additional controls at the gateways into 
the cloud from the local network. 
Based on the deployment model and the services that the responsible party wants to commit into the cloud 
environment the data security controls will have to be aligned with the risk associated with the model followed. 
4.3) Impact on Cloud Service Providers 
 
The various legislative requirements around the world regarding data storage and data processing have created a 
layer of complexity to most cloud service providers. 58 countries have National data privacy legislation governing 
the use of personal information (Imperva, 2013). Most developed countries has some form of juristic requirement 
on where data is stored as well as having requirements as to the controls and safeguards that is required before 
the service provider can receive data.  
The POPI Bill places the onus on the responsible party to implement the eight principles as well as sections 19 to 
21 regarding security measures but as the cloud service provider might be entity doing the storing and processing 
of the sensitive data the responsibility resides with the cloud provider to implement and maintain the necessary 
safeguards and processes to discharge these requirements. 
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4.3.1) Information processed by operator or person acting under authority – Section 20  
 
Section 20 of the Bill states: 
 
 
 
 
 
The CSP will have to perform only the processing that is required in terms of the service level agreement 
discussed in 4.2.1. The responsibility to comply with this section can be implemented by through access into the 
cloud through a web browser. 
The complexity will however be due to the requirement that data in the cloud be partitioned (See 3.1 – Multi-
Tenancy Model) and with numerous users needing access a strong controls over the virtualization of servers (See 
section 3.4.3) the CSP will have to implement strong controls over access. 
Ryan (2013) comments that the cloud environment is not different from a normal network environment as data is 
always vulnerable irrespective of where it is stored and there are numerous ways to secure this data storage and 
processing, but cloud computing brings the additional risk that data can be accessed by the cloud provider, his 
sub-contractors and employees. 
Ryan (2013) further discusses four possible ways to secure the data from access by the CSP. Possible solutions are 
to use fully homomorphic encryption (See 3.4.2), Key translator in the browser (See 3.4.5), Hardware-Anchored 
security (see 3.4.6) using the trusted platform module hardware chip and CryptDB. 
CryptDb has not been discussed in this study as it is a form of SQL queries that uses encryption keys to access 
encrypted data decrypt the data and return the correct data required by the query. Encryption has been 
discussed in 3.4.2. 
4.3.2) Security measures regarding information processed by an operator – Section 21 
 
The Bill defines the responsibility clearly for operators/cloud service providers. The cloud service provider has to 
perform the following actions to comply with section 21 (1). 
Section 21 of the POPI Bill requires the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 20  An operator or anyone processing personal information on behalf of a responsible party or an operator, must- 
(a) process such information only with the knowledge or authorisation of the responsible party; and  
(b) treat personal information which comes to their knowledge as confidential and not disclose it, 
unless required by law or in the course of the proper performance of their duties. 
 
Section 21 (1) A responsible party must, in terms of a written contract between the responsible party and the operator, 
ensure that the operator which processes personal information for the responsible party establishes and 
maintains the security measures referred to in section 19. 
(2) The operator must notify the responsible party immediately where there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the personal information of a data subject has been accessed or acquired by any unauthorised person. 
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In order for the operator/cloud service provider to discharge the obligations imposed by the bill a structured 
process has to be followed.  
The first steps are to implement an information security framework (see 3.2) and the appropriate cloud 
governance structures that support the framework (see 3.3).  
To manage the technical side of the requirements of section 21 (1), Imperva (2013) submits that an additional six 
steps has to be followed to allow the operator/CSP to manage the obligation. Step five and six both refer to 
monitoring access and alerting the appropriate parties the two steps has been combined and is discussed in 
intrusion detection. 
The steps that Imperva proposes are set out below: 
Step 1) Identify all PPI (Personal Identifiable Information) and Sensitive data 
A cloud service provider needs to identify all PPI and sensitive data stored in the cloud. PPI data cannot be 
managed, monitored or safeguarded unless all locations where sensitive data is stored across the cloud network 
are identified. 
As PPI data might be moved by users IP addresses and host names needs to be recorded and the cloud will have 
to be continually scanned for similar PPI and other sensitive data. 
Step 2) Find, analyse and correct database vulnerabilities 
Cloud service providers need to implement a thorough data risk management process that needs to be on-going. 
The cloud service provider can use database vulnerability assessment tools such as DISA STIG (Defence 
Information Systems Agency Security Technical Implementation Guides) or CIS benchmarks (Centre for Internet 
Security). 
The DISA STIG publications contain technical guidance on how to protect information systems and software 
products and the CIS Benchmarks are consensus based, best practice security configuration guidelines both 
developed and accepted by government, business, industry and academia. 
Any vulnerability identified needs to rank according to their severity. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS) can be used and risk can be measured and weighted accordingly. 
Step 3) Identify users that has access to Private Information 
Sensitive data in the cloud can be stored and processed amongst numinous databases and to identify all user 
rights and privileges can be a complex task for the cloud service provider. 
The cloud service provider has to aggregate access rights and store these in a single repository. Actively manage 
(review rights for appropriateness) the access rights of dormant users and restrict the rights of active users to 
sensitive information. 
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Step 4) Protect data from Unauthorised Access 
Imperva refers to encryption and the masking of sensitive data but the securing of the cloud has been discussed 
and investigated in detail in Chapter 3 and there are numerous methods of obtaining the required security as well 
as measuring its effectiveness.  
Step 5) Detect data base intrusions 
Cloud Service provider has to implement an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or preferably an Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention System (IDPS) (see section 3.4.5)  
The requirement legislated in section 22(1) regarding the notification of the data subject if PPI information has 
been accessed will be addressed by the IDS or the IDPS. The notification will not be performed by the IDS system, 
but the CSP will be informed of a breach and notification process will be instigated from the alarm raised by the 
IDS. If the Cloud Provider can prevent access this is preferable due to both the civil responsibility that might arise 
from the unauthorised use of a data subject’s information and the reputational and trust damage that will be 
incurred if there is a large amount of data compromised. 
Section 22 of the Bill states (only applicable sections noted): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If a data base intrusion is detected and not contained the bill requires explicit disclosure to the data subject. This 
can either be in the form of a letter, e-mail or on the website of the responsible party or published in the news 
media. (POPI, 2009) 
Chapter 6 of the Bill requires that a party must notify the Regulator prior to processing and as the majority of 
processing in the cloud will be automated this requirement is problematic and will require the CSP to implement 
additional processes to comply with this requirement. 
 
 
 
 
Section 22  (1) Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the personal information of a data subject has 
been accessed or acquired by any unauthorised person, the responsible party must notify –  
(a) The Regulator; and 
(b) subject to subsection (3), the data subject, unless the identity of such data subject cannot 
be established 
(3) The Responsible party may only delay notification of the data subject if a public body responsible for 
the prevention, detection or investigation of offences or the Regulator determines that notification will 
impede a criminal investigation by the public body concerned.                                                                                                                                                                        
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4.3.3) Notification 
 
Chapter 6 (Sections 50 to 54) of the Bill is especially onerous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section requires that the responsible party must notify the individual whose personal information is being 
processed at the time of collection regarding the purpose of collection and the parties to whom the personal 
information will be disclosed. If the personal information is collected directly from the individual, then the 
notification must take place before the collection.  
This is practically difficult for a business as businesses evolve and the uses and third parties that might be exposed 
to the information changes over time. To inform the individual at the source of all of the possible uses and parties 
involved will hinder that gathering of information due to more time required to complete the process as well as 
placing a administrative burden on the business gathering the information. 
If information is not gathered form an individual the business must ensure that the notification takes place as 
soon as reasonably practical after the collection of the personal information. 
Additional to the notification of the data subject the Regulator must also be notified of the processing as required 
in section 51. This will require that controls be built into the processing system to inform the business and 
possibly the Regulator each instance where data is processed for a different reason than was previously 
Section 50 requires that a responsible party must notify the Regulator before commencing the- 
(a) fully or partly automated processing of personal information or categories of personal information intended to 
serve a single purpose or different related purposes; and 
(b) non-automated processing of personal information intended to serve a single purpose or different related 
purposes, must be notified if this is subject to a prior investigation. 
The notification referred to above must be noted in a register kept by the Regulator for this purpose. 
Section 51 requires that the notification must contain the following particulars: 
(a) The name and address of the responsible party; 
(b) the purpose of the processing 
(c) a description of the categories of data subjects and of the information or categories of information relating 
thereto; 
(d) the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal information may be supplied; 
(e) planned transborder flows of personal information; and 
(f) a general description allowing a preliminary assessment of the suitability of the information security measures to 
be implemented by the responsible party to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information 
which is to be processed. 
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communicated. This could require a substantial investment in programming time to build the system that passes 
this detail to the Regulator.  
The responsible party will only have to give notice once and the notification does not have to be repeated every 
time information is processed or received, only when the purpose of the processing has changed. 
Any processing which departs from that that which has been notified to the Regulator must be recorded and kept 
for at least three years. 
4.4) Enforcement (Offences, Penalties and Administrative fines) 
 
Chapter 11 of the Act deals with the enforcement and implications of the Act. 
Selected sections of chapter 11 will be discussed below: 
4.4.1) Offences and Penalties 
 
The implications of the POPI Bill can only be studied in relation to the severity of the penalties that can be 
imposed if the requirements of the Bill are not adhered to. By legislating the requirements for processing and 
storing personal data the legislature has raised the risk from a purely reputational impact to that of possible 
incarceration. 
The relevant sections of the Bill are discussed below: 
Table 4.3 lists the sections of the Bill that may not be contravened and is punishable by a prison sentence up to 10 
years. Table 4.4 lists additional sections that may not be contravened, but here the prison term is limited to a 
maximum of 12 months. 
 
Table 4.3 – Contravention of these sections will be penalised for 10 years imprisonment 
Sections in the Bill 
that may not be 
contravened 
Discussion of Section 
100 Obstruction, hindering or unlawfully influences the Regulator or any person acting on 
behalf or under direction of the Regulator. 
103(1) Responsible party fails to comply with an enforcement notice (Issued in terms of 
section 95 instructing the responsible party to either take specific steps or refrain from 
taking specific steps or stop processing personal information specified in the notice. 
104(2) Any person after being sworn in or making an affirmation gives false evidence, knowing 
such evidence to be false or not knowing or believing it to be true, is guilty of an 
offence. 
105(1) A responsible party who contravenes the provisions of section 8 (responsible party to 
ensure lawful processing through 8 principles) insofar those provisions relate to the 
processing of an account number of a data subject.  
106(1), (3),(4) Unlawful acts by third parties in connection with an account number such as a person 
knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the responsible party (1) obtains or 
discloses an account number, selling an account number (3) which was unlawfully 
obtained or offering to sell an account number unlawfully obtained (4). 
Source: Compiled from the POPI Bill, 2009 
Section 107(a):  Any person convicted of an offence in terms of this Act, is liable, in the case of a contravention of section- 
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Contravention will result in the following: 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 - Contravention of these sections will be penalised for 12 months imprisonment 
Sections in the Bill 
that may not be 
contravened  
Discussion of Section 
59 In terms of section 57 and 58 the Regulator has to be informed if a responsible party 
plans to do any processing for another purpose than the one which the identifier was 
specifically intended at collection and with the aim of linking the information with 
information processed by other responsible parties. Section 59 deems it an offence if 
the disclosure was not done and the possible penalty is set out after the table. 
101 Section 101 deems anybody that contravenes section 54 guilty of an offence. Section 
54 requires that any person acting on behalf or under the direction of the Regulator 
must treat all personal information as confidential. 
102 Obstructing a person in the execution of a warrant. 
103(2) Any responsible party that knowingly makes a false statement or recklessly make a 
material false statement in the compliance of an information notice in terms of section 
90 (Notice from Regulator to responsible party requesting information on what 
processing is taking place) 
104(1) Any person failing without cause to attend legal proceeding based on a summons. 
Source: Compiled from the POPI Bill, 2009 
Contravention will result in the following: 
 
 
The penalties imposed by the Bill are severe and punishable by ether prison sentences or administrative fines as 
can be seen below. These penalties are not trivial and will serve as a deterrent to responsible parties and 
operators (CSP) to comply with the legislative requirements. 
4.4.2) Administrative Fines  
 
Section 109 (2) (b) states that a notice will be given to the responsible party that will specify the alleged offence 
and section (c) requires that the amount of the fine must be specified, subject to chapter 11 section 10, but not 
exceeding R10 million. 
Section 109 (2) (d) of the Bill states: 
 
 
 
Section (d) The infringer may: 
(i)  pay the administrative fine; 
(ii) make arrangements with the Regulator to pay the administrative fine in instalments; 
(iii) elect to be tried in court on a charge of having committed the alleged offence referred to in 
terms of this Act. 
 
A fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or both a fine and such imprisonment; or 
Section (b)- 
 
  A fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or both a fine and such imprisonment. 
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If the Infringer elects (iii) above the case must be handed over to the South African Police Force and the infringer 
has to be informed accordingly. 
Section 10 states that the Minister may after consultation with the Regulator adjust the amount of R10 million 
that is referred to in section 2 (c) by taking the consumer price index into account over the previous 12 months. 
4.5) Conclusion 
 
The signing by Parliament of the POPI Bill has raised the question regarding the impact of the Bill on businesses 
gathering, processing and storing personal information. The further complexity regarding cloud computing 
storage and processing has necessitated a study regarding the major effects of the Bill in relation to cloud 
computing users and providers. 
The Bill places the onus to protect personal information on the responsible party regarding its gathering, 
processing and dissemination and if the responsible party uses a cloud service provider this responsibility is 
shared.  
The Bill is also specific in its requirement regarding cross-border information flows and the penalties and fines 
that it proposes if contravened. 
The study posed the question whether cloud computing was still a viable processing and storage method after the 
implementation of the Bill. This question was investigated in Chapter 4 by comparing the requirements of the Bill 
to the literature study of possible solutions performed in Chapter 3. 
It can be concluded that some of the cost benefits that cloud computing promises will be negated by the 
additional legislative requirements that the Bill imposes. This conclusion is based on the premise that prior to the 
Bill businesses would have had some form of security controls regarding data gathering, processing and storage, 
but The Bill has now placed specific requirements on the responsible party and the CSP and these will require an 
increased level of data security controls. Additional to this the complexity of cross-border data flows and the 
requirements of the Bill will definitely require an increased level of legal involvement to provide assurance that a 
specific CSP can be used. 
CSP’s will also be impacted as the Bill was based on international legislation and in order to retain their clients 
they might have to enter into stringent SLA’s and additional monitoring processes to discharge the shared 
responsibilities of the Bill.   
There can be no doubt that the promulgated Bill will have an effect on the way that personal data is stored and 
processed in South Africa and where data is of such a sensitive nature cloud computing and its benefits might not 
be a viable solution when the risks are compared to the benefits. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
Cloud computing is a new field in Internet computing that provides novel perspectives in internetworking 
technologies and raises issues in the architecture, design and implementation of existing networks and data 
centres (Pallis, 2010). 
With a growing number of businesses investigating a move to the cloud computing paradigm due to the perceived 
cost benefits and unlimited resource availability the impact of this paradigm shift has to be compared with the 
growing trend of legislating the protection of personal information. 
The benefits of cloud computing is evident and to understand the hype around cloud computing it is relevant to 
summarize them. The list is not exhaustive or complete. 
 Lower computer hardware costs. No high-powered and high-priced computer is required to run cloud 
computing's web-based applications. Since applications run in the cloud, not on the desktop PC, your 
desktop PC doesn't need the processing power or hard disk space demanded by traditional desktop 
software. When you're using web-based applications, your PC can be less expensive, with a smaller hard 
disk, less memory, more efficient processor, and the like.  
 Improved performance. Computers in a cloud computing system boot and run faster because they have 
fewer programs and processes loaded into memory.  
 Reduced software costs. Most cloud computing applications, such as the Google Docs suite, are totally 
free. That's a lot better than paying $200+ for similar Microsoft Office software.  
 Instant software updates. A Cloud computing system has the potential to ensure that the latest web-
based updates happen automatically and are available the next time there is a connection to the cloud. 
When a web-based application is accessed, the latest version will be available without requiring paying 
for or downloading an upgrade.  
 Improved document format compatibility. There are no format incompatibilities or limitations on 
documents created on one computer that is running a different version of the same software as all 
documents created by web-based applications can be read by any other user accessing that application.  
 Unlimited storage capacity. Cloud computing offers virtually limitless storage.  
 Increased data reliability. Due to the fact that data is stored in the cloud and the cloud service provider 
having more resources to secure and backup data the risk of data being corrupted is less than in a 
desktop environment. 
 Universal document access. Documents are always available as long as there is a connection to the cloud. 
An example of this type of solution is DROPBOX. 
 Latest version availability. Another document-related advantage of cloud computing is that all parties 
using a document or updating a document always as the current document available.  
 Device independence. The User of the cloud computing paradigm is no longer constraint by a single 
computer or network.  Computers and mobile devices are thin clients to the cloud and as long as there is 
an Internet connection available the user can move freely in his environment. Change computers, and 
your existing applications and documents follow you through the cloud.  
To a business with limited resources cloud computing will seem like a solution to enable low cost, scalable 
processing where the user is only billed for the processing capacity used. 
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The type of business and the type of data that the business collects and processes will either confirm this premise 
or if the data is of a personal or sensitive nature it might result in a very expensive and complex system of 
processing and monitoring to the responsible party. Cloud computing relies heavily on the trust of third parties to 
implement the same stringent controls that a responsible party will have in their home network with the 
increased complicity of multiple users having access into the cloud. 
This securing of the cloud is a daunting task and based on the study it would seem that even though the benefits 
noted above creates a very strong argument to move processing and data storage to the cloud the users and 
potential customers do not fully trust the paradigm (Bose, Luo, Lui, 2013) and (Circle ID Survey 2009). 
This lack of trust is a central consideration for a business prior to moving into the cloud and with from a South 
African point of view these considerations became infinitely more important with the signing of the Protection of 
Personal Information Bill in August 2013. 
 In Chapter 2 the study investigated the impact of the new POPI Bill on cloud computing users by firstly 
investigating what technology constitutes cloud computing, its deployment and service models, and how it is 
defined. These studies resulted in a new cloud computing definition and based on this the data security controls 
that could be implemented to secure the defined cloud where investigated. 
In Chapter 3 the requirements for secure data as it is legislated in the POPI Bill where used as a guideline in the 
investigation into the security themes that can be implemented to secure the cloud computing environment. The 
study focused on general themes and addressed each layer of the cloud computing environment and how to 
secure these layers. At a strategic level governance, risk management and information security frameworks 
where studied and at a data level encryption was investigated. Cloud computing uses virtualisation to store and 
process data and the controls that could be implemented where investigated. The interaction that users have 
with the cloud will normally take place through a web browser and the security that could be implemented where 
studied. The study concluded by looking at the methods to detect unauthorised access into the cloud as well as a 
hardware solution that when implemented will result in trusted computing between computers. 
In Chapter 4 the detailed requirements and impact of the POPI Bill was investigated and the technology studied in 
Chapter 3 is mapped to the requirements of the Bill in figure 5.1. 
The list of security measures are not exhaustive as the network design, deployment model used and service 
model might require additional security to discharge the requirements of the Bill. 
The solutions are mapped based on the fact that either the responsible party or the cloud service provider or both 
has to address these requirements and based on the SLA between the parties the minimum requirements may 
differ.  
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Table 5.1 - Mapped security measures to POPI Bill requirements  
Principle/ 
“Condition” 
Discussion Policy and procedure Technical Data Security 
Measure 
Accountability The responsible party must ensure 
that the principles contained in the 
POPI Bill and all the measures that give 
effect to the principles are complied 
with. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 SLA 
 
Technical 
measures to 
address 
accountability 
are addressed in 
the “Security 
Safeguards” 
section 
Processing 
Limitation 
Personal information may only be 
processed in a fair and lawful manner 
with the consent of the individual. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 SLA  
 
 Virtualisation 
Monitoring 
 Cloud Intrusion 
Detection and 
Prevention 
Purpose 
Specification 
Personal information may only be 
processed for specific, explicit defined 
and legitimate reasons. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 
 Virtualisation 
Monitoring 
 Cloud Intrusion 
Detection and 
Prevention 
 Web Service and 
Browser Security 
 Agreement with 
client regarding 
processing  
Further 
processing 
limitation 
Personal information may not be 
processed for a second purpose unless 
that processing is compatible or 
supplementary to the original 
purpose. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 
 Agreement with 
client regarding 
processing 
Information 
Quality 
Responsible parties must ensure that 
personal information is kept reliable, 
accurate and up-to-date. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 
 Virtualisation 
Monitoring 
 Cloud Intrusion 
Detection and 
Prevention 
 Web Service and 
Browser Security 
Openness Regulator and the data subject to be 
aware that personal information is 
being collected by the responsible 
party. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 
 Agreement with 
client regarding 
processing 
 Cloud Intrusion 
Detection and 
Prevention 
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Principle/ 
“Condition” 
Discussion Policy and procedure Technical Data Security 
Measure 
 Network 
transmission 
security 
Security 
Safeguards 
Personal information must be kept 
secure against risk of loss, 
unauthorised access, interference, 
modification, destruction or 
disclosure. 
 Information 
Security Framework 
 Cloud Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
processes 
 Cloud risk 
identification 
processes 
 
 Encryption 
 Virtualisation 
Monitoring 
 Web Service and 
Browser Security 
 Cloud Intrusion 
Detection and 
Prevention 
 Trusted 
Computing 
Module’s 
Data subject 
participation 
Data subjects may request the 
correction or deletion of any personal 
information held about them that may 
be inaccurate, misleading or outdated. 
  Web Service and 
Browser Security 
 Virtualisation 
Monitoring 
 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Bill has set out the roadmap for responsible parties and cloud service 
providers to ensure lawful processing and secure data storage.  
The principles of the Bill place the onus on the responsible party to comply and ensure lawful processing and if 
the processing and data storing are performed in the confines of a local network the responsible party will have 
control over the data security.  
If the storage and processing is however performed in the cloud the only recourse to the responsible party is to 
consolidate the requirements of the Bill into a Service level agreement and to obtain independent assurance of 
the implementation and continued working of the cloud service provider data security controls. 
Due to the complexity of cloud computing with numerous access nodes securing the cloud is a technical challenge 
and the fact that numerous users with unique access details might be required to interact with the cloud will 
result in complex access controls. 
Information is an asset, like any other critical business asset and thus should be suitably protected. Businesses are 
increasingly interconnected which results in information being exposed to a growing number of threats and 
vulnerabilities. The move to legislate as in effect re-valued the information asset and as the process limitations 
and cross border data movement constraints are enforced the value of information will increase steadily. 
Implementing cloud computing can provide businesses with an edge through cost savings but before embarking 
on the cloud computing path a thorough investigation needs to be performed by the responsible party regarding 
the type and sensitivity of that data that will be exposed to the cloud and with the POPI Bill and the Patriot Act 
placing onerous legislative requirements on cloud parties the cost savings might just be negated by legislative 
burden. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
62 | P a g e  
 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard setting body is currently completing ISO/IEC 
27018 – Code of practice for data protection controls for public cloud computing services and this might assist to 
formalize the requirements regarding data protection. 
The legal implications of the POPI Bill have not been tested and further study based on future case law and 
interpretations will be warranted. 
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